

HISTORY OF GUJARÁT

MARATHA PERIOD, 1757-1817.

J. A. BAINES,

BOMBAY CIVIL SERVICE.

For the Bombay Gazetteer

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HISTORY OF GUJARAT.

Marátha Period 1757—1819.

It will be evident from what has been related in the Musalmán portion of this history that long before 1760, the Maráthás had a firm foothold in this province, and were able to dictate to the local chiefs the policy of the Deccan Court. Long before 1819 too, Marátha influence was on the wane before the rising fortunes of the British. Between these two dates, however, is comprised the whole, or nearly the whole of the period, during which this race was virtually paramount in Gujarát. From each of them the political history took a new departure, and on this account they serve respectively to denote the starting point and terminus of Marátha supremacy.

Most of what took place before 1760 is so interwoven with the interests and intrigues of the Muhammadan delegates of the Court of Delhi that it has been fully described in the history of the Musalmán period. It is, however necessary, in order to trace the growth of the Marátha power, to briefly set forth in a continuous narrative the events in which this race was principally concerned, adding such as transpired independently of Musalmán politics.

This task is rendered easier by the very nature of Marátha policy, which has left little to be recorded of its action in Gujarát beyond the deeds and fortunes of its initiators and their adherents.

The connection of the Maráthas with Gujarát can be divided by the chronicler into the following periods.

First, the time of predatory inroads, from 1664 to 1743 ; before the leaders of these expeditions had permanently established themselves within the province.

Secondly, what may be termed the mercenary period ; when the Maráthás, partly by independent action, but far more by a course of judicious interference in the quarrels of the Muhammadan officials, and by loans of troops, had acquired considerable territorial advantages. Towards the end of this period, as has been already seen, their aid was usually sufficient to ensure the success of the side which had managed to secure it, and at last the capital itself was claimed and held by them.

Then came the time of domination, from 1760 to 1801, during which period the Gáikwár influence was occasionally greater than that of the Peshwa. From 1802, internal dissensions at the Courts of Poona and Baroda weakened the hold the Maráthas had on the province, and the paramount power had to all intents and purposes, passed over to the British long before the downfall of Bájiráv Peshwa and the final annexation of his rights and territory in 1819.

Shortly after, when the Gáikwár made over to the British the work of collecting the tribute from Káthiáwár, Marátha supremacy came to an end.

1664.
First inroad by
Shiváji.

The first Marátha force that made its appearance in Gujarát was led there early in 1664, by Shiváji. This leader was at the time engaged in a warfare with the Moghals, which, however desultory, required him to keep up a much larger force than could be supported out of the revenues of his dominions. He therefore looked to plunder to supply the deficiency, and Surat, then the richest town of western India, was marked down by him as an easy prey.

His mode of attack was cautious. He first sent one Bahirji Náik to spy out the country and report the chances of a rich booty, whilst he himself moved a force up to Junnar on pretence of visiting some forts in that direction recently acquired by one of his subordinates.

On receiving a favourable report from Bahirji, Shiváji gave out that he was going to perform religious ceremonies at Násik, and taking with him 4,000 picked horsemen, he marched suddenly down the Gháts and through the Dáng jungles, and appeared suddenly before Surat. There he found an insignificant garrison, so he rested outside the city six days whilst his men plundered at their leisure. On hearing of the tardy approach of a relieving force, sent by the Governor of Ahmedabad, Shiváji beat a retreat with all his booty to the stronghold of Ráygad. By the time the reinforcement reached Surat, the only trace of the invaders that remained was the emptied coffers of the inhabitants.

About the same time, or shortly after, the fleet which Shiváji had equipped at Alibág about two years before came up to the mouth of the gulf of Cambay and carried off one or two Moghal ships which were conveying to Mecca large numbers of pilgrims with their rich oblations.¹

1670.
Second attack by
Shiváji.

This insult to the Muhammadan religion was enough to incense the bigotted Aurangzeb, apart from the additional offences of the sack of Surat and the assumption, in 1665, of royal insignia by Shiváji. He, therefore, sent an expedition to the Deccan strong enough to keep the Maráthás for some time away from Gujarát. One of Shiváji's officers, however, seems to have attacked a part of the Surat district in 1666, and to have got off safely with his spoils. In 1670, Shiváji again descended upon that city with about 15,000 men. The only serious resistance he experienced was, as before, from the English factors. He plundered the town for three days, and only left on receiving some information about the Moghals' movements in the Deccan, which made him fear lest he should be intercepted on his way back to the country about the Gháts.

1671.

He left a claim for 12 lakhs of rupees to be paid as a guarantee against future expeditions. It is possible, however, that as he does not

¹ Surat was known as Báb-ul-makkah or gate of Mecca on account of its being the starting place of the ships annually conveying the Muhammadan pilgrims of India to the shrine of their prophet.

appear to have taken any immediate steps to recover this sum, that the demand was only made in accordance with Marátha policy, which looked upon a country once overrun as tributary, and assumed a right to exercise paramount authority over it, by virtue of the completed act of a successful invasion. In 1671 the fleet was ordered to sail up the gulf, and plunder Broach, and it is probable that Shiváji intended at the same time to levy tribute from Surat, but the whole expedition was countermanded before the ships sailed.

The conduct of the military authorities in Gujarát, with regard to this expedition of 1670, was such as to render it highly probable that the Moghal leaders were in complicity with the Maráthás in order to gain the favour and support of their leader. Shortly before Shiváji's arrival, there had been a large garrison in Surat, apparently kept there by the Governor, who suspected that some attempt on the town would soon be made. This garrison was withdrawn before Shiváji's attack, and almost immediately after his departure, 5000 men were sent back again. The commanders of the Moghal army in the Deccan¹ were Jasvant Singh and Prince Muazzam. The former had once been Viceroy of Gujarát² and shortly after Shiváji's second expedition, was re-appointed to that post.³ He had, moreover, been accused of taking bribes from Shiváji during the operations in the Deccan. Prince Muazzam, again, had every reason for wishing to secure to himself so powerful an ally as Shiváji in the struggle for the imperial crown that took place, as a rule, at every succession. Aurangzeb, reasoning from his own experiences as a son, refused to allow a possible heir to his throne to become powerful at court; and accordingly sent him against Shiváji with an army quite inadequate for such operations. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suppose that, if there had not been some previous understanding between Shiváji and the Moghal leaders, the troops that were known to be within easy reach of Surat, would have been found quite strong and numerous enough either to have repulsed him altogether, or to have prevented at least the three days' sack of the city.

A year or two after this Shiváji took some of the small forts to the south of Surat, such as Párnera and Bagváda,⁴ whilst Moro Trimal got possession of the large fort of Sálér,⁵ in Báglán, which guarded one of the most frequented passes from the Deccan into Gujarát. The Maráthás were thus able in future to command the routes to which their expeditions could most conveniently be despatched.

No further incursion was made till 1675, in which year a Marátha force first crossed the Narbada. On the resumption of hostilities between Shiváji and the Moghals, Hasáji Mohiti, who had been made

¹ Rája of Jodhpur in Rajputáná.

² From 1659 to 1662.

³ In 1671 for three years.

⁴ Now in the Párdi sub-division of the Surat district.

⁵ Overlooking the Dáng forests, over 5,200 feet above the level of the sea. Báglán is now divided into the Sátára and Kalvan sub-divisions of the Násik district.

As this road was one of those most frequented by both pilgrims and merchants, the Delhi authorities were obliged, in 1716, to organize an expedition against Dábháde. The leader of the force was one Zulfikar Beg, an officer inexperienced in Marátha warfare. Dábháde found little difficulty in decoying him into a mountainous country, and there completely defeating him with the usual Marátha accompaniment of plunder.

1716.
He defeats the
Moghal force.

Finding himself once more in the Deccan, Khanderáv Dábháde took the opportunity of rejoining the Court at Sátára, from which he had long been absent. He was lucky enough to arrive just as the Senápati, Manáji Morár, had failed on an important expedition and was consequently in disgrace. The Rájá (Sháhu), pleased with Khanderáv's recent success against the Delhi troops, divested Manáji of the title of Senápati, and bestowed it upon the more fortunate leader.

Dábháde is appointed Senápati.

Khanderáv remained away from Gujarát for three years, accompanying, meanwhile, Báláji Vishvanáth the Peshwa, to Delhi where the latter was engaged in negotiations for the confirmation of the Marátha rights to *Chauth* and other tribute from certain districts in the Deccan.

Negotiations by
the Peshwa at Delhi
regarding Gujarát.

It is evident that at this time there was no definite claim to tribute from Gujarát on the part of the Marátha Government; for in spite of the intrigues of Báláji and the weakness of the Court party at Delhi no concessions were obtained with regard to it, although the Marátha dues from other parts of the country were fully ratified. The grounds on which Báláji demanded the tribute from Gujarát were that Sháhu would thereby gain the right to restrain the excesses of Marátha freebooters from the frontier and would guarantee the whole country against irregular pillage. The argument was a curious one, considering that the most troublesome and notorious freebooter of the whole tribe was at the elbow of the envoy, who was so strenuously pleading for the right to suppress him. It is probable that Báláji foresaw that Khanderáv's newly acquired rank would take him for a time from Báglán to the Court, so that meanwhile an arrangement could be made to prevent the growth of any powerful chief in the Gujarát direction who might interfere with the plans of the central Government. The Marátha statesman was as anxious to ensure the subordination of distant feudatories, as the Moghals to secure the freedom of the Ghát roads to the coast.

In the redistribution of authority carried out about this time by Báláji Vishvanáth, the responsibility of collecting the Marátha King's dues¹ from Gujarát and Báglán was assigned to Khanderáv, as Senápati; but as these dues were not yet settled, at least as regards the country below the Gháts, Khanderáv seems to have remained with the Peshwa in the field.

At the battle of Bálápur, fought against the Nizám-ul-mulk, one of the officers of Khanderáv, by name Dámáji Gáikwár, so distinguished

1720.
Rise of the Gáik-
wár family.

¹ Chauth and Sardeshmukhi as settled in 1699.

himself that the Senápati brought his conduct prominently to the notice of Rája Sháhu. The latter promoted Dámáji to be second in command to Khanderáv with the title of Shamsheer Bahádur, which had been formerly borne by one of the Atole family in 1692. This is the first mention of the present ruling family of Baroda. Before many months both Khanderáv and Dámáji died. The former was succeeded by his son Trimbakráv, on whom his father's title was conferred. Piláji, nephew of Dámáji, was confirmed in his uncle's honours and retired to Gujarát. As soon as he could collect a sufficiently strong force, he attacked the Surat district and defeated the Musalmán commander close to the city itself. After extorting from him a handsome sum as ransom, Piláji returned eastwards. He selected Songad,¹ a fort about fifty miles east of Surat, as his headquarters, and from thence made continual excursions against the neighbouring towns. He once attacked Surat, but although he defeated the Moghal leader, he seems to have contented himself with contributions levied from the adjacent country, and not to have entered the town. Piláji soon obtained possession of some strongholds in the Rájpipla country, between Nándod and Ságbára, which he fortified, as Khanderáv Dábháde had formerly done. Here he resided as representative of the Senápati, whose family had removed for a while to the Deccan. The tribute collected from Báglán and Gujarát was supposed to be transmitted by Piláji to the royal Treasury through the Peshwa; but there is no record of these dues having been levied with any regularity, or even fixed at any special amount. Whilst Trimbakráv was taking an active part in the affairs of his royal patron in the Deccan, Piláji occupied himself in sedulously cultivating the good-will of the border tribes surrounding his residence in Gujarát.

1723.

First imposition of regular tribute on Gujarát.

The year 1723 is noteworthy as being the date of the first imposition of the regular Marátha demand of one-fourth, *chauth*, and one-tenth, *sardeshmukhi*, of the revenue of Gujarát. Whilst Piláji was directing his attacks against Surat and the south of the province another of Rája Sháhu's officers, who had been sent up towards Málwa, entered Gujarát by the north-east, and after ravaging the country round Dohad,² settled a fixed tribute on the district.

The Maráthas engage in Muhammadán's struggles.

This officer, Kantáji Kadam Bánde, was soon after engaged by one of the parties struggling for the vice-royalty of Ahmedabad to bring his cavalry into the province and take part in the civil war. The leader of the opposite party, Rustam Ali, enlisted the services of Piláji Gáikwár. The Nizám-ul-Mulk, whose influence in the Deccan was very great, managed to detach Piláji from Rustam Ali's side. This was the easier, as Rustam had already defeated Piláji more than once in attacks by the latter against Surat, of which district Rustam was governor. There are two different accounts³ of what took place when the rival forces came into action, but both show clearly that the Marátha leaders acted on both sides with utter

disregard of their agreements and looked only to plundering the Muhammadan camps, whilst the soldiers were engaged in battle. After the defeat of Rustam, the two Marátha chiefs joined forces and proceeded to levy *chauth*, of which the Moghal Deputy had granted Piláji a share equal to that of his first ally, Kantáji.

This division led to quarrels and at last to an open rupture between the two Marátha leaders, which was only patched up by the grant of the *chauth* north of the Mahi river to Kantáji, and of that to the south, to Piláji. The chief ground of quarrel seems to have been the relative position of the Gáikwár, as agent for the Senápati, who had a right to collect all dues from Gujarát, and Kantáji, who claimed superior rank as holding his commission direct from Rája Sháhu. On hearing of this dispute and the consequent partition of the Marátha tribute, Trimbakráv Dábháde himself hastened up to Cambay with an army, but effected nothing, and seems to have retired, leaving Piláji to look after his interests at Ahmedabad. Both the latter, however, and Kantáji soon after withdrew from Gujarát, but were within a short period encouraged to return by the success of a raid made by another leader, Antáji Bháskar, on the north-east district.

Dissensions between the Marátha leaders.

1725.

They both joined Hamid Khán in his resistance to the new viceroy, but received several checks from the reinforcements of the Muhammadan army, and after plundering a while again returned to their strongholds for the rainy season.

Next year they returned for the tribute and plundered as usual. The Peshwa, Bájiráv, then opened for the first time direct negotiations with the viceroy of Gujarát. The rapid increase of the authority of the Bráhman ministers at the Rájá's court in the Deccan had aroused the jealousy of the Marátha nobles, amongst whom Trimbakráv Dábháde was one of the most influential. Bájiráv, being fully aware of the fact, and having by this time acquired from the Rájá the power of acting with foreign powers independently of the throne, determined to undermine Trimbakráv's authority in Gujarát by aiming at the rights said to have been formally granted to him by Hamid Khan over the country south of the Mahi. He, therefore, applied to the viceroy for a confirmation of the right to levy *chauth* and *sardesh-mukhi* over the whole country, on condition that he would protect it from the inroads of Kantáji, Piláji and other irresponsible freebooters. The viceroy had still some resources left at his disposal and was in hopes that his repeated applications to Delhi for assistance would soon meet with a favourable answer. He declined therefore to accede to Bájiráv's proposals at once, on the grounds that the Court at Delhi had repudiated the concessions made to Piláji and Kantáji by his predecessor's deputy. As, however, the depredations, on the frontier caused serious injury, both to the revenues and the people, he allowed the Peshwa to send a feudatory, Udáji Povár, chief of Dhár, through the Moghal territories, to operate against Piláji. The latter, who was fully aware of these negotiations, persuaded Kantáji to join him in expelling the agents of the Peshwa party, as it was clear that if Piláji's forces were scattered, the way would be open for Udáji

1726.

Negotiations opened by the Peshwa independent of Dábháde.

The Marátha Chiefs unite against the Peshwa and his allies and are successful.

1727.

to attack Kantáji himself. The two then proceeded to Baroda and after a while drove back Udáji, and occupied Baroda and Dabhoi. Here Piláji remained, and next year Kantáji succeeded in taking Chámpáner, thus advancing his posts nearer the centre of the province. With such an advantage gained these two chiefs, instituted raids still more frequently than before. In these straits, and finding himself utterly neglected by the Emperor, the viceroy re-opened negotiations with the Peshwa, who lost no time in sending his brother, Chímnáji A'ppa, with an army through Gujarát. Petlád and Dholka were plundered, but Kantáji was left undisturbed, so he took this opportunity of marching to Sorath, where he remained for some time, extorting tribute. The viceroy agreed formally to cede the *sardesmukhi* of the whole revenue, land and customs, (with the exception of the port of Surat and the districts attached to it), and the *chauth* of the same district, with five per cent on the revenue from the city of Ahmedabad. Special clauses were inserted in the grant of *chauth* to suit the convenience of both the Peshwa and the viceroy. The latter stipulated that as few collectors as possible should be kept by the Maráthás in the districts under tribute; and that no extra demands beyond the $\frac{1}{4}$ should be made. He also insisted that the percentage should be calculated on the actual collections, and not on the "*Kamál*" or highest sum recorded as having been collected.¹ The Maráthás were also to support the imperial authority and to keep up a body of horse. The Peshwa agreed (probably at his own request) to prevent all Marátha subjects from joining disaffected chiefs, or other turbulent characters, thus receiving the right to suppress Kantáji and Piláji, as well as the Bhils and Kolis with whom the latter was on such friendly terms.

1728.

Formal cession of
tribute to the Mará-
tha power.

After this agreement was executed, Bájráv made over part of the *sardeshmukhi* to the Dábháde, as well as the *mokása*, or $\frac{1}{4}$ of the *svaráj*, as settled by Báláji Vishvanáth. The consideration, as set forth in the preamble of this agreement, was the great improvement effected by the Marátha rulers as regards the wealth and tranquillity of the Deccan provinces. This was inserted either to give the transaction the appearance of having been executed on the part of the Emperor, (for otherwise the viceroy had no concern in the state of the Deccan,) or simply as an expression of gratitude on the part of this special viceroy towards the Maráthás who had just brought to terms the Nizám-ul-Mulk, his former rival and enemy. It is even probable that it was merely intended, as usual with such preambles, to veil the forced nature of the treaty.

The hostile movements of the Pratinidhi in the south Marátha country induced the Peshwa to return to the Deccan. Kantáji returned from Sorath to Chámpáner, plundering part of the viceroy's camp on his way. Trimbakráv Dábháde, jealous of the interference of the Peshwa in the affairs of Gujarát, began to intrigue with other chiefs to over-turn the power of the Bráhman ministers.

¹ The Marátha practice was to base their demands on the standard or *tankha* assessment (which was seldom if ever collected) so that by this means they evaded all possibility of claims against them for over-collections.

As soon as Nizám-ul-Mulk became aware of this discontent on the part of Trimbakráv, of whose power he was well informed, he proposed to assist him by an attack on the Peshwa from the east, whilst the Maráthás operated in another direction. Trimbakráv was successful in his overtures with Piláji Gáikwár, the Bándé, the Povárs and a few other chiefs resident in Khándesh or the north Deccan. The troops sent by them to join his standard soon amounted to 35,000 men, who were collected in Gujarát. He then gave out that he was bent on rescuing the Marátha Rája from the thralldom in which he was being kept by the Bráhmans. The Peshwa, who had discovered the intercourse between Trimbakráv and the Nizám, proclaimed this treason on the part of the Dábháde, as a royal officer, and stated that the mal-contents were only planning the partition of the inheritance of Shiváji between the Rája of Kolhápúr and themselves. As soon as he found the Nizám's troops were on the march, he collected his picked men and advanced on the Dábháde in Gujarát.

1730.

Coalition amongst Maráthá chiefs against the Peshwá.

The Peshwá's army was inferior in numbers, but consisted of better trained men. He closed at once with the allies near Dabhoi, and easily defeated the undisciplined forces of the Povárs and Bándé. The Dábháde's army, however, had more experience of regular warfare and made a stand. But a stray shot killed Trimbakráv as he was endeavouring to rally the forces of his allies, and as usual in such engagements, the loss of the leader disheartened the army. Utter confusion ensued, in which many of the nobles fell, others ran away, and the Peshwa, without the necessity of pushing further his advantage, made good his retreat to the Deccan. The Nizám, who was in pursuit, only managed to capture some of the baggage with the rear guard, as it was crossing the Tápti near Surat.¹

1731.

Defeat of the allies by the ministerial army. Death of Trimbakráv Dábháde.

Once, safe again in the Deccan, the Peshwa began negotiations with both the Nizám and the adherents of Trimbakráv Dábháde. He recognized the rights of the former to some possessions in Gujarát, independent of the Viceroy of Ahmedabad, and agreed to further his designs of severing the Deccan from the possessions of the Emperor. He conciliated the Dábháde family by establishing at Poona an annual distribution of food and presents to Bráhmans such as had formerly been the practice in the native village² of Khanderáv. This institution was known as "Dakshina."

Policy of the Peshwa towards the Dábháde and Gáikwár families.

Bájráv acquiesced also in the general tendency amongst Maráthás of all offices to become hereditary, and conferred the title of Senápati on Yeshvantráv, the minor son of the deceased Trimbakráv. The widow, Umábái, became guardian, and Piláji Gáikwár deputy, or *Mutálik* in Gujarát. This latter appointment seems to have been made by the Peshwa and not by the Dábháde, for Piláji received at the same time a new title, namely, that of *Sena Khás Khel* or commander of the special band, or perhaps, the household brigade. He was also bound on behalf of the Senápati to respect the Peshwa's

¹ At Gala, 12 miles or so above Surat in the territory of the Gáikwár.

² Tálegaon, north-west of Poona, now a station on the railway to Bombay.

rights in Málwa and Gujarát, and to pay with regard to half the collections from the territory he administered to the royal treasury through the minister. A provision was also inserted to future acquisitions. This reciprocal agreement was executed at the special command of the Marátha Rája Sháhu, who had not yet quite abrogated his authority in favour of the Peshwa. Piláji, after these negotiations, retired to Gujarát.

1732.
Assassination—of
Piláji Gáikwár.

His influence amongst the Bhils and other troublesome races dwelling in the wild parts of the eastern frontier made him an object of hatred and fear to the Moghal Viceroy, who had him assassinated by one of his adherents whilst the latter was pretending to whisper some important and confidential news in Piláji's ear. This event took place at Dákor, in the Kaira district.

The followers of the Gáikwár slew the assassin and retired south of the Mahi. They were driven by the Moghals out of Baroda, but continued to hold Dabhoi. Dámáji Gáikwár, son of Piláji, was at this time prowling round Surat watching for an opportunity of interfering in the disturbed affairs of that town. One of the candidates for the governorship had offered him one-fourth the revenue of the city for his assistance, but the expedition was deferred on account of the appointment of a rival by the Emperor. Dámáji, therefore, was preparing to act on his own account independently of his ally. The news of his father's assassination, however, took him northwards. He found that the Desái of Pádra, near Baroda, had stirred up the Bhils and Kolis to revolt, in order to give the relations of Piláji a chance of striking a blow at the murderers of their deceased leader. Umábái Dábháde, too, bent on the same errand, moved down the Gháts with an army. The Maráthás were bought off, however, by the Viceroy and peace was restored for a while.

1733.

In this year, also, Jádoji, a younger son of Trimbakráv made an expedition to collect tribute through Gujarát, as far as Sorath. Next year Mádhavráv Gáikwár, brother of Piláji, obtained possession of Baroda during the absence of Sher Khán Bábi, the Governor. Since that date this town has been the capital of the Gáikwár family.

Sindia and Holkar soon afterwards joined the Chief of I'dar against the Musalmán deputy, and extorted from the latter a considerable sum as ransom.

1735.
Procedure of the
Maráthá deputy go-
vernor in Gujarát.
1736.

Umábái had recognized Dámáji as her agent, in succession to Piláji; but as she required Dámáji in the Deccan, the latter had been obliged to leave in his turn a *locum tenens* in Gujarát. There ensued quarrels between this deputy, named Rangoji, and Kantáji Kadam which brought Dámáji back again, and after obtaining from the Muhammedan Viceroy, who had espoused the cause of Kantáji, a grant of one-fourth the revenues of the country, north of the Mahi, he went, as usual, to Sorath. Kantáji Kadam, who as a partisan of the Peshwa, was hostile to the Senápati, harassed the country within reach of his frontier. Dámáji, meanwhile, had again proceeded to the Deccan, where Umábái was intriguing against the Peshwa, and required all the help she could obtain to further the ambitious schemes she was devising in the name of her half-witted son. His deputy Rangoji,

by demanding a heavy price for his aid at a time when an aspirant to the vice-royalty of Ahmedabad was in distress, managed to secure for the Maráthás half the revenue of Gujarát with certain exceptions. 1737.

Dámáji then moved into Gujarát again, and on his way to join Rangoji, extorted Rs. 7,000 from the English at Surat, as a guarantee against plundering them. The events of this year have been detailed in full in the history of the Musalmán period. After getting possession of a great part of the city of Ahmedabad the Maráthás, by their oppressive rule, excited a rising amongst the Musalmán inhabitants. Similar quarrels and subsequent reconciliations took place between 1739 and 1741, the Musalmáns distrusting the Maráthás, yet not daring to attempt to oust them. Dámáji, on his way back from one of his Sorath expeditions, laid siege to Broach, which was held by a Muhammedan officer direct from the viceroy of the Deccan. 1738, 1739.

As the latter personage was still regarded by the Marátha chiefs as a possible ally against the Peshwa, Dámáji at once obeyed the request of the Nizám to raise the siege, but probably obtained a promise of future concessions, such as he had acquired at Surat. 1741.

Rangoji, in the absence of Dámáji, took up his residence in Borsad. There he fell into several disputes with the Muhammadan officials, in the course of one of which he was taken prisoner, but escaped the next year (1743). 1742.

Meanwhile Dámáji had joined with Rághoji Bhonslé in attacking the Peshwa. Whilst Rághoji was preparing his army in the east, Dámáji made a feint against Málwa, which had the desired effect of withdrawing a large portion of the ministerial army. The Gáikwár's troops retreated without giving battle, but to prevent any future junction between Dámáji and the Bhonslé party in Berár, Báláji Peshwa confirmed the Povár family in their claims to Dhár, which had never been acknowledged as their territory since the defection of the Povárs to the Dábháde party in 1731. It is worth remarking that though the rank of Senápati had apparently been made hereditary in the Dábháde family (for the owner of the title was quite unfit for the command of an army), the Ghorpadé family applied at this time to have it restored to them on the ground that it once had been held by one of their house. The Peshwa, however, managed to secure their alliance by a grant of land, and their claims to the chief command of the army seem to have been waived.

For the next two years the Marátha force in Gujarát under Rangoji and Deváji Tákpar was employed by the Musalmáns in their quarrels regarding the vice-royalty. The Marátha practice of appointing deputies gives rise to some confusion as to the negotiations that took place about this time between the Gáikwár's party and the rival candidates for the office of Subhedár. For instance, Umábái Dábháde had appointed the Gáikwár family as her agents-in-chief, but the principal members of that house were absent in the Deccan. Dámáji 1743-44.

¹ Broach was constituted part of the Nizám's personal estate on his resigning the vice-royalty in 1722.

Gáikwár had appointed Rangoji, who in his turn left one Krishnáji in charge of the Marátha share of the city of Ahmedabad. On the departure, however, of Dámáji from Gujarát, Umábái left Rámáji as her agent. Rámáji who seems to have been employed previously by Dámáji, followed the example of his predecessors and placed one Rámachandra in charge at Ahmedabad. There does not appear to have been any direct agent of the Peshwa in Gujarát at this time.

1745.

On Khanderáv Gáikwár's return from the Deccan, he demanded the accounts of the tribute from Rangoji, and not being satisfied with this agent confined him in Borsad and appointed one Trimbakráv in his place. Umábái caused Rangoji to be set at liberty and sent to her in the Deccan, after which she reappointed him her agent. He expelled Trimbakráv from Ahmedabad, but was attacked by Krishnáji and Gangádhara, two other late deputies. Dámáji and Khanderáv were obliged at last to come to Gujarát and summon all these deputies to their presence. A private arrangement was concluded under which Khanderáv was allowed by Dámáji to keep Nadiád and Borsad as a private estate and to act as the Gáikwár's deputy at Baroda. Rangoji was to live at Umreth when not on active service. Gangádhara and Krishnáji were censured and forbidden to engage in any independent alliances with the Muhammadan leaders.

1746.

After this Dámáji sent a general named Kánoji Tákpar to collect the Sorath tribute whilst he himself retired to Songad.

Rangoji returned to Ahmedabad, and not long after began to quarrel with the viceroy about the Marátha share in the revenue of the city, ceded in 1728.

1747.

The Gáikwár obtains a voice in Surat affairs.

In the same year Kedárji Gáikwár, cousin of Dámáji, was asked by Syed Achan, an aspirant to the governorship of Surat, to assist him in maintaining possession of that city. Before Kedárji could reach Surat the disputes as to the succession had been settled by negotiations, and the aid of Marátha troops was no longer required. Kedárji, however, finding himself in a position to dictate terms, demanded three lakhs rupees for the aid that he was prepared to give, and as the Surat treasury could not afford to pay this sum in cash, one-third of the revenues of Surat was promised to the Gáikwár.

1748.

Intrigues of the Marátha leaders against the minister.

Rangoji, meanwhile, attacked Hariba, an adopted son of Khanderáv Gáikwár, and recovered from him the town and fort of Borsad, which had been seized during the time that Rangoji had been occupied with his disputes in Ahmedabad. Khanderáv and Dámáji both turned against him and captured the fort after a long siege. Rangoji was then again imprisoned, and not released until the next year, when the Peshwa sent a body of troops into Gujarát. In 1748 Umábái, widow of Trimbakráv Dábháde, died, leaving one Báburáv guardian of Yashvantráv, her son. Partly through the solicitations of Khanderáv, who had private influence with the Dábhádes, partly from the fact of previous possession, Dámáji was confirmed as deputy of the Maráthás in Gujarát. He there began to collect an army, as quickly as possible, in order to co-operate with Raghnáth Bhonslé against the Peshwa, in answer to an appeal by Sakvárbái, widow of Sháhu to support the throne against the ministers, and to secure the

succession of Sambhájí to the Sátára kingdom. The Peshwa, quite aware of Dámájí's ill-will towards himself did his best to foment disturbances in Gujarát and to extend his own influence there, so as to keep Dámájí away from the Deccan.

He accordingly, entered into some negotiations with Jawán Mard Khán, then in power at Ahmedabad; but was unable to lend substantial aid in Gujarát against Dámájí's agents, as the whole Maráthá power was required in the Deccan to operate against the son of the late Nizám-ul-Mulk.

1750.

Next year, Dámájí, at the request of Tárábái, guardian of Rám Rája, ascended the Salpighát with a strong force, defeated the Peshwa's army and advanced as far as Sátára. From this position he was forced to retire, and whilst in treaty with the Peshwa was treacherously seized by the latter and put into prison. Bálájí at once demanded arrears of tribute, but Dámájí declined to agree to any payment, on the ground that he was no independent chief, but only the agent of the Senápati. He therefore refused to bind his principal, or himself on account of what was due from his principal. Bálájí then imprisoned all the members of the Gáikwár and Dábháde family that were at that time in the Deccan.

1751.

Arrest of Dámájí
Gáikwár.

The state of Surat was at this time such as to afford a good opportunity to the Peshwa to obtain a footing there, independently of the English or of Dámájí. He had recently had dealings with the former in the expeditions against A'ngria of Kolába, and as the merchants had found him one of the most stable and powerful rulers of the country, they were willing to treat with him for the future security of their buildings and goods in Surat. Taking advantage of Dámájí's confinement, Bálájí sent Ragunáthráv to Gujarát. This leader, afterwards so well known as Rághoba, took possession of a few *tálukás* in the north-east of the province; but was recalled to the Deccan before he could approach Surat.

The Peshwa negotiates direct with the Surat authorities.

Jawán Mard Khán, also, took advantage of Dámájí's absence to make an expedition into Sorath and Káthiáwár where the Gáikwár family had now established themselves permanently.

The news of these two expeditions made Dámájí very eager to return to his province; and as he had full information as to Bálájí's plans with regard to Gujarát, he bribed freely, and in order to regain his liberty consented to much harsher terms than he would otherwise have done. He agreed to maintain an army for defence and collection purposes in Gujarát, as well as to furnish a contingent to the Peshwa's army in the Deccan, and to contribute towards the support of the Rája, now in reality a state-prisoner dependent upon the wishes of his minister. The Gáikwár was also to furnish the tribute due on account of the Dábháde family, whom the Peshwa was apparently trying to oust from the administration altogether. After deducting the necessary expenses of collection and defence, half the surplus revenue was to be handed over to the Peshwa. Even after acceding to all these proposals, the Gáikwár was not at once released. The Peshwa protracted the negotiations, as he had to contend against a factious court party in whose counsels he knew Dámájí would play a leading part when once set at liberty. At last, however, after

1752.

Release of Dámájí
and his return to
Gujarát.

agreeing to a final request that he would assist Raghunáthráv against Surat, Dámáji was allowed to go. There was at this time one Pándurang Pant levying tribute on behalf of the Peshwa in Cambay and Ahmedabad. The Nawáb of Cambay, not having any reason to like or trust his neighbour the Gáikwár, had persuaded the Peshwa at the time the partition of the Maráthas rights over Gujarát was being settled at Poona, to take Cambay into his share of the province.

The Nawáb bought off the agent of his ally with a present of guns and cash. The ruler of Ahmedabad also came to terms with the Maráthas, so Pándurang was at liberty to go and see if he could find equal good fortune in Sorath.

Dámáji now came back with a fresh army, which was soon reinforced by Raghunáthráv.

1753. They marched towards Ahmedabad, and Jawán Mard Khán was too late to intercept them before they invested the capital. He managed, however, by a bold movement, to enter the town; but after a long time was obliged to capitulate and march out with the honours of war.

Joint operations
of the Gáikwár and
Peshwa's armies.
Capture of Ahme-
dabad.

The Maráthas conferred on him an estate in the north-west of Gujarát, which, however, was recovered by them some time afterwards.

1754. After taking possession of the town in April 1753, Raghunáthráv went to Sorath, and on his return extorted a large sum as tribute from the Nawáb of Cambay. He left a deputy in Ahmedabad, who marched against the same chief again in 1754, but on this occasion he could levy no tribute. As this Nawáb had firmly established himself and considerably enlarged his dominions, the Peshwa's deputy marched against him in person a second time, but was defeated and taken prisoner. The nominee of Raghunáthráv procured his release, and the Peshwa's deputy continued to demand arrears of tribute for his master till he obtained an agreement to pay at a future date. He then retired to the Deccan, and the Nawáb, taking advantage of the lull to strengthen his army, captured Ahmedabad from the Marátha garrison and established himself in the city. After a while Dámáji and Khanderáv Gáikwár, with an agent sent direct by the Peshwa, arrived before the town and commenced a siege. It was not until April 1757 that the Maráthas again entered the city. The Nawáb surrendered after the Maráthas had fully ratified the conditions he himself had proposed.

1757.

1758. Sayájiráv, son of Dámáji, remained in Ahmedabad on behalf of his father, and the Peshwa's agent Sadáshiv, put in a deputy in his turn and went himself to Surat. Here he was soon joined by Sayáji who had to arrange the shares of the tribute in accordance with the partition treaty of 1751. Next year, a body of Marátha troops was sent to the aid of the Rav of Cutch, who was engaged in an expedition against Tatta in Sind. Sadáshiv lent the Nawáb of Cambay some money on the part of the Peshwa to enable him to liquidate the arrears of pay due to his army, but a year afterwards the Marátha army appeared at the town gates with a demand for two years' arrears of tribute, in full amounting to Rs. 20,000. The Nawáb managed to raise this sum, and the Maráthas moved southwards. Dámáji was at this time in Poona.

The Peshwa had supported Syed Achan of Surat with the view of putting him under an obligation so as to secure some future advantages, and this year lent him some troops as a body guard. The Nawáb of Cambay, who was also indebted to the ministerial party, left his dominions to pay a visit to the Peshwa at Poona. Khanderáv meanwhile plundered Lunávada and I'dar, whilst Sayájiráv was similarly engaged in Sorath.

1759.

Dámáji Gáikwár accompanied the Peshwa to Delhi, and was one of the few Marátha leaders that escaped after the defeat at Pá nipat.

1761.

On his return to Gujarát he successfully opposed an expedition by the Nawáb of Cambay against Bálásinor and retook the estates of Jawán Mard Khán. He also strengthened his position in Sorath and Káthiáwár against the Peshwa's party.

The Peshwa, being hard pressed by his rival, the Nizám, began in this year to make overtures to the East India Company's officers in Bombay, with a view to getting the aid of European artillery and gunners. He at first offered to give up a valuable tract of land in Jambusar. But the English demanded no territory but the island of Sálsette, the town of Bassein, and the small islands in the harbour of Bombay. These the Marátha Government declined to give up, so negotiations were broken off.

1761.

Next year Raghunáthráv, as guardian of the son of Báláji, named Mádhavráv, who was still a minor, conferred the title of Senápati on one of the Jádhav family, who had formerly borne it. The administration of Gujarát, however, which had always accompanied the title when held by the Dábháde family, was left practically in the hands of Dámáji, and no mention of any transfer of it was made at the time Jádhav was appointed commander-in-chief. Discontented with the empty honour thus conferred, Rámchandra, the new Senápati, joined the Nizám's party, and on account of this defection the Peshwa, two years afterwards, cancelled the appointment and restored the office to the Ghorpadé family, one of whose members had held it long before. This put an end to the connection of Gujarát with the chief military dignity of the Marátha state.

1762.

The title of Senápati is transferred from the Dábhádi to the Ghorpadé family.

After Mádhavráv Báláji came of age he had constantly to be on his guard against the plots of his uncle Raghunáthráv, who had refused to accept the share in the government offered him by the young Peshwa. Raghunáthráv, perhaps, instigated by his wife, had, no doubt, great hopes of obtaining a share in the whole power of the administration, and suspecting Mádhavráv to be aware of his designs, looked upon all the overtures made by the latter as intended in some way or other to entrap him.

1768.
Intrigues of Rághoba.

He therefore collected an army of some 15,000 men in Báglán and Násik, and hoping to be joined on his way by Jánoji Bhonslé, advanced towards Poona. In his army was Govindráv, son of Dámáji Gáikwár, with a detachment of his father's troops. The Peshwa, without giving Jánoji time to effect a junction with Raghunáthráv, even if he had been prepared to do so, defeated his uncle's army at Dhorap, a fort in the Ajunta range, and carried off Rághoba and Govindráv to Poona, where they were placed in confinement.

Death of Dámáji
Gáikwár.

Not long after this action, Dámáji died. He had brought the fortunes of the Gáikwár house to the highest pitch they ever reached, and not long after his death the family influence began to decline. It was his personal authority alone that was able to counteract the usual tendency of quasi-independent Marátha states towards disintegration, especially when they are at a distance from the central power. Khanderáv and Sayájiráv had shown frequent signs of insubordination, (as for instance in their espousal of the cause of Rangoji) and a desire to establish themselves in an independent position, but the sagacity of Dámáji foresaw the advantage such a partition would give an enemy like the Peshwa, and his tact enabled him to preserve unity in his family, at least in resistance to what he showed them to be their common foe.

Dispute about the
succession.

The quarrel for the succession that arose on Dámáji's death was the first step towards the breaking up of the Gáikwár's power. Dámáji had three wives. By the first he had Govindráv, who, however, was born after Sayájiráv, the son by the second wife. His sons by the third wife were Mánáji and Fatehsingh. Govindráv was in confinement at Poona near the court, and therefore in a position to offer conditions for the confirmation of his rights without loss of time.

In the Hindu law, current amongst Maráthás, there are to be found precedents in favour of the heirship of either Govindráv or Sayájiráv. Some authorities support the rights of the son of the first wife, whether he be the eldest or not; others, again, regard simply the age of the claimants, deciding in favour of the first born, of whatever wife he may be the son.

Rámráv Shástri, the celebrated adviser of Mádhavráv Peshwa, is said to have expressed an opinion in favour of the rights of Sayájiráv. Govindráv, however, was on the spot where his influence could be used most extensively. Sayáji, moreover, was an idiot and a puppet in the hands of his half brother, Fatehsingh.

Govindráv applied at once for investiture with the title of Sena-Khás-Khel. A payment of 50½ lakhs of rupees to the Peshwa, on account of arrears of tribute and a fine for his conduct in taking part with Rághoba was a strong argument in his favour, and when he agreed to a tribute previously demanded from his father of Rs. 7,79,000 yearly and to maintain a peace contingent at Poona of 3,000 horse, to be increased by a thousand more in time of war, there could be little doubt as to the legitimacy of his claim and he was duly invested with his father's title and estate.

1771.

For reasons not apparent Sayáji's claims were not brought forward till nearly two years later. Govindráv had never been allowed to join his charge in Gujarát; so that he could exercise no interference in that direction, and the court affairs in the Deccan left, perhaps, little time for the disposal of Sayájiráv's application, even if it had been made. Sayáji had entrusted his interests to Fatehsingh, a man of considerable ability, who came at once to Poona to get a reversal of the recognition of Govindráv.

The Peshwa was glad to have this opportunity of undoing so much of Dámáji's work and dividing the Gáikwár family against itself, so using the verdict of Rám Shástri as his weapon, he cancelled the

former grant in favour of Govindrāv, and appointed Sayājirāv with Fatehsingh as his *mutālik* or deputy. The latter, by agreeing to pay an extra sum of 6½ lakhs of rupees annually, got permission to retain the Poona contingent of Gáikwār horse in Gujarát, on the pretext that Govindrāv would probably attack his brothers on the earliest opportunity. Thus, whatever happened, all went to the profit of the Peshwa's party and to the injury of the tax-paying Gujarát ryot.

Fatehsingh retired in triumph to Baroda, and opened negotiations with the English in Surat, as he had been endeavouring to do for a year past without success.

1873.

In January 1773, however, he succeeded in getting an agreement from the chief for affairs of the British nation in Surat, that his share in the revenues of the town of Broach, which had been taken by storm in 1772 by the English, should not be affected by the change of masters. In the same year Náráyanráv Peshwa was murdered, and Rághoba was invested by the titular king at Sátára with the ministerial robe of honour. Govindrāv Gáikwār, still in Poona, reminded the new Peshwa of the good offices of the Gáikwār family at Dhorap elsewhere, and found means of getting reinstated as Sena-Khás-Khel. In 1774 he set out for Gujarát, and collecting a fair number of adherents on his way, he attacked Fatehsingh. After various engagements of little importance, the latter found himself shut into the city of Baroda, which was invested by Govindrāv, in January 1775.

1774.

In the meantime Rághoba had been driven from power by the intrigues of Bráhmans of a different class from that to which he belonged, headed by the afterwards well-known Nána Phadnis. The ex-Peshwa first betook himself towards Málwa, where he hoped to be joined, or at least assisted by Holkar and Sindia. As soon, however, as he got together some scattered forces he marched down the Tápti and opened negotiations with the English through Mr. Gambier, the chief at Surat. The Bombay Government at once demanded the cession of Bassein, Sálsette and the adjacent islands. Rághoba refused, partly, in all probability, on account of the pride felt by the Marátha soldiery in their achievements before Bassein at the time of the great siege. He, however, offered valuable territory in Gujarát, yielding a revenue of about eleven lakhs, and to pay six lakhs down and 1½ lakhs monthly for the maintenance of a European contingent with artillery. The English at Bombay were debating whether this offer should not be accepted when news reached them that the Portuguese were about to organise an expedition to retake Bassein. Negotiations with Rághoba were hastily broken off and a small force sent to forestall the rival Europeans. Before the end of 1774, both Thána and another fort in Sálsette had been taken.

Proceedings
Rághoba.

Rághoba now heard that Sindia and Holkar had been bought over by the ministerial party and would not come to his assistance. Quickly moving his force down the river he reached Baroda in January 1775 with 10,000 horse and 400 foot. He joined Govindrāv in investing that town, but sent meanwhile an agent to re-open the discussion of his proposals in the Bombay Council. This agent was captured by a party of Fatehsingh's horse whilst he was out on an

1775.

Rághoba arrives in
Gujarát.

expedition near Párnara on behalf of Govindrāv. On his release he repaired to Surat and took steps to get a treaty of alliance signed as soon as possible.

He is defeated.

The ministerial army of 30,000 men under Haripant Phadke entered Gujarát and obliged Govindrāv and Rághoba to raise the siege of Baroda and to retire towards the Mahi. Fatehsingh's force then joined Haripant. An attack on all sides was made (Feb. 17th). Rághoba, who was in the centre, was first charged and before Govindrāv and Khanderāv Gaikwár could come to his assistance his best officers were wounded, some of his Arab mercenaries refused to fight as large arrears of pay were due to them, and he was defeated on both flanks. He fled to Cambay with only 1,000 horse; whilst the two Gaikwárs and Manáji Sindia (Phákde) led the rest of the scattered army to Kapadvanj where it was again set in order. The Nawáb of Cambay, fearing lest the Marátha army should come in pursuit, shut the town gates on the fugitive and refused to give him shelter. Mr. Malet, Chief of the English residents, who had been informed of the negotiations in progress between his Government and Rághoba, contrived to get the ex-Peshwa conveyed privately to Bhávnagar and from thence by boat to Surat. Here he arrived on February 23rd.

And by the help of the English reaches Surat.

Treaty between the English and Rághoba.

The stipulations of the treaty negotiated by Narotamdás, Agent of Rághoba, and the Bombay Government were as follows:—The English were to provide a force of 3,000 men, out of which 800 were to be Europeans and 1,700 natives, together with a due proportion of artillery. In return for this Rághoba, still recognized as Peshwa, was to cede in perpetuity Sálsette, Bassein and the islands, Jambusar and Olpád. He also made over an assignment of Rs. 75,000 out of the revenues of Anklesvar, the remaining portion of which district, together with A'mod, Hánsot and Bulsár, was placed under British management as security for the monthly contribution of 1½ lakhs for the support of the troops in his service. He also promised to procure the cession of the Gaikwár's share in the revenues of Broach. Sundry other provisions (dealing with different parts of the Marátha dominions) were inserted, Rághoba being treated throughout as the representative of the Marátha kingdom.

This treaty was signed on March 6th, 1775, at Surat, but on the previous day there had been a debate in the Council at Bombay as to the propriety of continuing to support Rághoba, as the news from Gujarát made the British authorities doubtful whether the contingent they had already sent to Surat was enough to ensure success.

Expedition under Colonel Keating to Gujarát:

Just before the treaty was drawn up, at the end of February, Lieut.-Colonel Keating had been despatched in command of 350 European infantry, 800 sepoys, 80 European Artillery men and 60 gun lascars, with other, in all about 1,500 men ready for active service. This force landed at Surat four days after Rághoba had arrived from Bhávnagar. Before receiving this token of the intention of the British to support Rághoba, the Nawáb had treated the latter simply as a fugitive, but upon finding that the Bombay Government had determined to make the ex-Peshwa their ally, he paid the customary visits and offered presents as to a superior.

He sets sail with Rághoba for Cambay.

When the news reached Surat that Govindrāv's troops and the rest had been re-organized at Kapadvanj, it was determined to effect

a junction with them by landing Colonel Keating's detachment at Cambay and from thence marching north.

Considerable delay occurred in carrying out the first part of this proposal. First of all, Rághoba detained the army at Dumas¹ whilst he paid a visit of ceremony to the frequented temple of Bhimpor in the neighbourhood. Then again, the convoy met with contrary winds the whole way up the gulf, and it was not till March 17th that the contingent landed.

The Nawáb, accompanied by the British resident, paid a visit of ceremony and presented *nazaránás* to Rághoba as a sort of atonement for his previous discourtesy and neglect. The Maráthas, however, knowing that this change of tone was entirely due to the presence and alliance of the Europeans, paid much more attention to the latter than to the Muhammadan.

The British contingent encamped at a place called Náráyan-Sarovar, just north of the town. Here they waited until the reinforcement from Bombay arrived, bringing the whole force up to the complement stipulated for in the treaty. Rághoba's army under Govindráv Gáikwár was reported to be moving southwards, and Colonel Keating, agreed to let it pass the Sábarmati river before joining it. Meanwhile the enemy, said to number 40,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry marched north to intercept Govindráv. The latter, however, by forced marches, succeeded in crossing the Sábarmati before the arrival of the ministerial army, and encamped a few miles north-east of Cambay, at a place called Darmaj, or *Dara*. Here Colonel Keating joined him about the middle of April.

Arrival of Govindráv Gáikwár with his Army.

Govindráv's army consisted of about 8,000 fighting men and nearly 18,000 camp followers. These latter were chiefly Pindháris who used to attach themselves to the camp of one of the Marátha Chiefs, on condition of surrendering to him half their plunder. Each chief had his separate encampment, where he exercised independent authority over his own troops, although bound to general obedience to the commander-in-chief of the whole army. The confusion of this arrangement is described by an eye-witness as utterly destructive of all military discipline. To add to the cumbrousness of such an expedition, most of the Pindháris brought their wives and children with them, the cooking pots and plunder being carried on bullocks and ponies, of which there were altogether nearly 200,000 attached to the troops. In every camp there was a regular *bazár* where cash payment or barter passed equally current, so that a premium was thus placed on the pilfering of small articles by the Pindháris, whose stipulations as to plunder were confined neither to friend nor enemy.

When all needful preparations had been made, the army, accompanied by a battery of ten guns, besides mortars and howitzers, all of which were manned by Europeans, moved out against the enemy. The latter slowly retreated, burning the crops and forage and destroying the water-supply on its way. On the 20th April the first engagement took place at Usámli, resulting in the repulse of the ministerial troops. On May 1st a similar skirmish on the banks of the Vátrak drove the ministerialists into Kaira. From this post they were driven after a series of slight engagements with the army of Rághoba, which

Advance of the combined forces and their operations.

¹ At the mouth of the Tápti, now belonging to the little Muhammedan State of Sachin.

crossed the river at Mátar. Fatehsingh now received a reinforcement of 10,000 horses under Khanderáv Gáikwár, but to counterbalance this aid, Sindia and Holkar from some unexplained cause, connected probably, with intrigues at Poona withdrew from further co-operation with him. Colonel Keating was unable to follow up the advantages he had gained owing to the large proportion of cavalry in the enemy's army. He therefore, continued his march southwards, after persuading Rághoba to spend the monsoon in Poona, where he would be on the spot to counteract intrigues, instead of at Ahmedabad, as had been at first proposed.

On May 8th the army reached Nadiád, after repulsing on the road two attacks by the enemy's cavalry. This result was obtained chiefly by means of the European light artillery. Nadiád belonged at this time to Khanderáv Gáikwár, and to punish his defection to Fatehsingh, Rághoba inflicted a fine of 60,000 rupees on the town.

The amount was assessed on the several castes in proportion to their reputed means of payment. The Bháts, a peculiar people of whom more hereafter, objected to being assessed, and slaughtered each other in public: so that the guilt of their blood might fall on the oppressor. The Bráhmans, who also claimed exemption from all taxation, more astutely brought two old women of their caste into the market place and there murdered them. Having made this protest, both castes paid their contributions. Rághoba injudiciously wasted seven days over the collection of this fine, and in the end only levied 40,000 rupees.

Serious engagement
and defeat of Fateh-
singh.

On May 14th the march was resumed, under the usual skirmishing onslaughts of the ministerial party. At Arás, where Rághoba had been defeated shortly before, he was in imminent danger of a second and still more serious discomfiture. An order mistaken by a British Company, and the want of discipline on the part of Rághoba's cavalry nearly led to a total defeat with great slaughter. The European infantry and artillery, however, turned the fortunes of the day. The troops of Fatehsingh were allowed to approach in pursuit to within a few yards of the batteries, all the guns of which then opened on them with grape, the infantry meanwhile plying their small arms along the whole line. Fatehsingh was obliged to withdraw his diminished forces and the army of Rághoba received no further molestations from him on its way to the Mahi. Colonel Keating then ordered a general move to Broach, where he arrived safely on 27th May, after a troublesome march through the robber-infested country between the Dhádhhar river and A'mod.

The ministerial ge-
neral retreats from
Gujarát.

Here they remained until June 8th, when Colonel Keating was about to move south again. Luckily, as it turned out for him, the nearest ford was impassable and he had to march to one higher up at a place variously called Bába Piára or Báva Pir. On his way thither he heard that Haripant, the ministerial commander-in-chief, was halting on the north bank by the ford; he therefore pushed to make an attack on the rear, but owing partly to timely information received, and partly to the confusion caused by the irrepressibility of Rághoba's cavalry, Haripant had time to withdraw all his force except some baggage and ammunition, which, with a few guns, he was forced in the hurry of his passage across the river to leave behind

Colonel Keating then marched 14 miles north from the ford and halted before proceeding to Dabhoi, a town belonging to Fatehsingh. The general ignorance of tactics and want of discipline in the native army had determined Colonel Keating not to lead his force as far as Poona, but to spend the monsoon near Baroda.

Rághoba detached one of his generals, Amir Khán, in pursuit of Ganeshpant, whom Hari Pant had left as his deputy in Gujarát. Ganeshpant with a detachment of the ministerial army had separated from Hari at the Bába Piára ford and found his way through the wild country on the north of the Tápti towards Ahmedabad. He was finally caught by Amir Khán.

Dabhoi was at this time in charge of a Bráhman governor, who submitted on the approach of Rághoba's army. Colonel Keating quartered his force in the town, but Rághoba, after exacting a levy of 3 lakhs of rupees, encamped at Bhilápur, on the Dhádhar, ten miles from Dabhoi. Here he began to negotiate with Fatehsingh in Baroda through the mediation of Colonel Keating. Fatehsingh was all the more ready to come to definite terms of agreement, as he knew that Govindráv was on the watch to recover Baroda.

The combined forces remain in Gujarát for the rainy season.

It is not certain what the terms proposed and agreed to really were—for the only record of them is a copy sent in 1802 to the Resident at Poona by Governor Duncan. According to this document, Govindráv was to lose his pension and to occupy the same position as before the accession of Rághoba. Khanderáv was to revert to the situation in which he had been placed by Dámáji. The provision of the treaty of the 6th March regarding the Gáikwár's claims on Broach was ratified and as a reward for the mediation of the Bombay Government, the Gáikwár ceded to the British in perpetuity the subdivisions of Chikhli and Variáv near Surat and Koral on the Narbada. Before this treaty could be concluded, Colonel Keating received orders to withdraw his contingent into British territory and to leave Rághoba to manage for himself. This change of policy was due to the disapproval by the Supreme Government of the treaty of 6th March, which they alleged had been made inconsistently with the negotiations then being carried on with the ruling powers at Poona as well as with the authority of the Calcutta Government. The treaty was therefore declared to be invalid and the troops in the field were ordered by the Supreme Government to be withdrawn at once into British garrisons. A special envoy, Colonel Upton, was sent from Bengal to negotiate a treaty with the Ministers in accordance with the views current in Calcutta.

Negotiations between Rághobá and the Gáikwárs.

As soon as the roads were open, Colonel Keating moved towards Surat, but at the solicitations of Rághoba he disobeyed his orders so far as to encamp at Kadod, about 20 miles east of Surat, but not in British territory. Here he awaited the results of the overtures of Colonel Upton. This envoy remained at Poona from the 28th December 1775 till the 1st March 1776, on which date he signed the treaty of Purandhar, in which the office only and not the name of the Peshwa is mentioned. By this compact the Peshwa ceded all claims on the revenue of Broach together with land in the neighbourhood of that town to the British. He also paid 12 lakhs of rupees in compensation for the expenses of the war. Súlsette was to be either retained by the

Withdrawal of the British contingent.

1776.
Negotiations at Poona.

English or restored in exchange for territory yielding three lakhs of rupees annually. The cessions made by Fatehsingh Gáikwár were to be restored to him if the Peshwa's Government could prove that he had no right to make them without due authorization from Poona.

The treaty of the 6th March was declared null and void. Rághoba was to disband his army and take a pension. If he resisted, the English were to give him no assistance. If he agreed to the terms proposed, he was to live at Kopargaon,¹ on the Godávári with an ample pension.

When he received information as to the terms of the new treaty, he at once declined to accept the pension, and, as he could not understand the position of the Bombay Government with regard to that at Calcutta, he proceeded to offer still more favourable terms for further assistance.

Rághoba takes refuge at Surat.

He was at Mándvi² on the Tápti when he was finally, given to understand, that the British could no longer aid him. He thereupon took refuge in Surat with two hundred followers. The rest of his army which had been ordered to disperse, gathered round Surat, on pretence of waiting for the payment of the arrears due to them. As their attitude was suspicious, and there were rumours of an expedition having started from Poona under Haripant to subdue them, the Bombay Government garrisoned Surat and Broach with all the forces it could spare.

Colonel Upton meanwhile offered Rághoba, on behalf of the ministers, a larger pension with liberty of residing at Benáres. This also was declined, and the ex-Peshwa fled to Bombay where he lived on a monthly pension allotted him by the Government.

On August 20th, 1776, a despatch of the Court of Directors arrived confirming the treaty of the 6th March 1775. At first the Bombay Government were inclined to take this as authorizing the retention of all the territory ceded, but on further deliberation it was decided that as the treaty of Purandhar had been ratified by the Supreme Government subsequent to the signing of the despatch, which was dated April 5th, 1776, it was evident that the Court of Directors did not mean to uphold the previous engagement more than temporarily, or until the final treaty had been concluded.

1777.
Further negotiations at Poona with regard to the Gujarát cession to the British Government.

At the end of 1776, a Bombay officer was sent in place of Colonel Upton to be a resident envoy at Poona for the carrying out of the provisions of the treaty. Mr. Mostyn was the person selected, and he arrived in Poona in March 1777. He soon found that the Ministers had little intention of adhering to the treaty, so he at once took up the question that he thought it most important to the Bombay Government to have settled, namely, the relations of the Peshwa's Court with Fatehsingh Gáikwár as regards the cessions of territory.

The Ministers asserted that the Gáikwárs merely administered Gujarát on the part of the Peshwa and were entirely dependent upon the Poona Government so that they could conclude no agreement with foreign states except with its approbation. Fatehsingh did not deny the dependence but evaded the question of his right to make direct treaties and claimed the restitution of the cessions on the ground that Raghunáthráv had failed to perform his part of the stipulations.

1. Now in the Ahmednagar district.

2. In the Surat district some 30 miles east of the city.

The point was discussed for some time, and at last the question of dependence seems to have been let drop, for in February 1778 Fatehsingh paid up the arrears of tribute, made the usual presents to the Ministers and their favourites and was again invested with the title of Sena-Khás-Khel.

1778.

In October a despatch from the Court of Directors reached the Governments of Bengal and Bombay, disapproving of the treaty of Purandhar, but ratifying it on the principle of *factum valet*. It was suggested, however, that in case of evasion on the part of the Ministers, a fresh treaty should be concluded with Rághoba on the lines of that of 1775.

In November 1778, it was rumoured that the Ministers in Poona were intriguing with the French, so the Bombay Government took this opportunity of entering into a treaty with Rághoba, who was still in Bombay. He confirmed the grants of 1775, and as security for the pay of the British contingent that was to help in placing him on the Peshwa's throne in Poona, he agreed to assign the revenues of Bulsár and the remainder of Anklesvar, as he had done before. He stipulated, however, that his own agents should collect the dues from these districts, and that the British should take charge of them only in case of the full sum due not being paid and then merely as a temporary measure.

Fresh alliance with Rághoba.

On the 22nd November 1778 the force moved out of Bombay, and by dint of mismanagement and internal dissension the campaign was brought to an end by the convention of the 16th January 1779. Under this agreement all possessions in Gujarát acquired since the time of Mádhavráv Peshwa were to be restored by the British, together with Sálsette, Uran and other islands. Rághoba was to be made over to Sindia's charge, and a separate treaty assigned to Sindia, the sovereignty of Broach.

1879.

The army meets with reverses and a convention is signed between the British and the ministerialists afterwards disavowed.

The council at Bombay disavowed the convention and were inclined to adhere only to the clause allotting Broach to Sindia. Mr. Hornby proposed to the Supreme Government an alliance with Fatehsingh, engaging to free him from dependence on the Poona Government and to reconcile the disputants within the Gáikwár family itself. After the arrival of General Goddard with reinforcements from Bengal the Governor General approved of the alliance proposed with Fatehsingh as head of the Baroda State, but specially declined to admit any participation or support in the family disputes. The British were to conquer for themselves the Peshwa's share of Gujarát, if they were able to do so.

Proposed negotiations with the Gáikwár's family.

Rághoba, meanwhile, who had been given over to Sindia to be conveyed to Bundelkhand, escaped with the connivance of his custodian and fled to Broach. This was evidently a move calculated on by Sindia to bring on hostilities between Nána Phadnis, the head of the ministerial party, and the English. General Goddard, who was conducting the negotiations with Poona on the part both of the Supreme Government and of the Government of Bombay, received Rághoba on June 12th, but evaded any proposals for a direct alliance. At the end of the rains of the same year, information was received by the English that a coalition against them had been formed by the Maráthás

~~Rághoba~~

1780.

Treaty between the
British and Fateh-
singh.

the Nizám and Hyder Ali of Mysore. The rumour was partially confirmed by the demand by Nána Phadnis for the cession of Sálsette and the person of Rághoba, as preliminaries to any treaty. No answer was given, but reinforcements were called for and the overtures with Fatehsingh pushed forward. This chief prevaricated about the terms of the treaty and evidently did not like to enter into any special engagement that might perhaps bring down upon him the Poona army. General Goddard, therefore, advanced on January 1st, 1780, against Dabhoi, which was garrisoned by the Peshwa's troops from the Deccan, whilst the English in Broach expelled the Maráthas officers from their posts and re-took possession of Anklesvar, Hánsot and Amod. On January 20th, Dabhoi was evacuated by the Maráthas and occupied by General Goddard. Fatehsingh now showed himself willing to enter into the proposed treaty, and on the 26th January 1780 signed an offensive and defensive alliance.

In the re-opening of hostilities there was no mention of Rághoba, but the ground given was simply the non-fulfilment on the part of the Peshwa of his treaty engagements. Rághoba remained under English supervision in the enjoyment of a large allowance. Dabhoi was occupied by an English civil officer with a detachment of irregulars, and General Goddard moved towards Ahmedabad.

By the treaty of 1780 the Peshwa was to be excluded from Gujarát. To avoid confusion in collection, the district north of the Mahi was to belong entirely to the share of the Gáikwár. The English were to enjoy the whole district south of the Tápti, together with the Gáikwár share in the revenue of Surat. In return for the support the English were to give him in withholding tribute from the Peshwa, Fatehsingh ceded Jinor on the Narbada and the Gáikwár's villages round Broach. These cessions, however, were not to have effect until Fatehsingh was in possession of Ahmedabad. The contingent of 3,000 horse, was to be still furnished by the Gáikwár Government.

Capture of Ahme-
dabad by General
Goddard.

As soon as these conditions were agreed upon, General Goddard went with his own army and the contingent furnished by Fatehsingh to Ahmedabad. After encamping before it for five days, he took the city by storm on February 15th, 1780.

Operations against
Sindia and Holkar.

Sindia and Holkar had combined forces against the English and were marching up Gujarát, plundering on their way. They were opposed by General Goddard who marched across the Mahi early in March. The allies turned off towards Chámpáner without risking a pitched battle on the plain. Sindia at once opened negotiations with the view of wasting time during the fair season. His first proposal was that Rághoba should be sent to Jhánsi, where Sindia had allotted him an estate, and that Bájráv, Rághoba's son, should be appointed *diván*, or manager of the Peshwa, Madhávráv, who was a minor. Bájráv himself was under age, so Sindia was, of course, to assume temporarily the reins of government.

Goddard at once refused to force Rághoba to take any course other than the one he should select of his own free will; for Sindia did not appear to be aware that the English were now at war with the ministers on their own account, and not as allies of an ex-Peshwa. Negotiations were broken off and Sindia and Holkar dislodged from place

after place without any decisive engagement being fought. General Goddard was preparing monsoon quarters for his army, when he heard that a division of a Marátha force, which had been plundering the Konkan, in order to cut off supplies from Bombay, had attacked parts of the Surat Athávisi. He detached some troops under Lieut. Welsh and sent them to the south, whilst he remained himself on the Narbada. Lieut. Welsh drove back the marauders and took possession of the forts of Párnera, Indargad and Bagváda.

After the monsoon of 1780, General Goddard went to besiege Bassein, leaving Major Forbes in charge of the Gujarát army. This officer posted one body of troops at Ahmedabad for the protection of Fatehsingh, another at Surat, a third at Broach. Two battalions of Bengal infantry were sent to Jinor and some few men to Dabhoi.

An attack was made by Sindia on the newly acquired district of Jinor, but Major Forbes successfully resisted it and Sindia's position with regard to his own dominions was now such as to prevent him from sending more expeditions against Gujarát.

1781.

The military necessities of other parts of India were such as to induce General Goddard to apply to Fatehsingh for an increase to his contingent, in accordance with the treaty of 1780. After some personal communications with this Chief in Gujarát, General Goddard was able to arrange with the Gáikwár for the defence of part of that province and thus set free some European troops for service elsewhere.

No further attack was made in this direction, during the continuance of the war which came to an end on May 17th, 1782. The treaty of Sálbye, between an envoy of the Governor General on one side and Mahádáji Sindia, as plenipotentiary for the Peshwa and minister of Poona on the other, replaced the Marátha territory in Gujarát exactly where it was on the out-break of hostilities against Rághoba in 1775. It was, however, specially stipulated that no demand for arrears of tribute during the late hostilities should be made against the Gáikwár, a clause that led to misunderstandings many years later. The town of Broach was given over to Sindia in accordance with the secret negotiation of 1779 and the votes of the Bengal and Bombay Councils. The territory round Broach yielding a revenue of three lakhs of rupees, ceded by the Peshwa, was likewise returned. Rághoba was granted a pension of 25,000 rupees a month and allowed to select his own place of residence.

Treaty of Sálbye
1782.

He went to Kopargaon and there died a few months after the conclusion of the treaty of Sálbye. Thus came to an end one of the chief sources of disturbance to the Poona Government.

For the next six years no event of any political importance took place in Gujarát, which province was left almost entirely to the administration of the Gáikwár family.

In 1789, however, Fateh Singh died, leaving Sayájiráv without a guardian. Mánáji, a younger brother, at once seized the reins of government and began the usual sort of negotiations to secure his recognition by the Poona Government. He paid a nazarána of 3,13,000 rupees and agreed to pay up thirty-six lakhs of rupees as arrears, though it is not clear on what account—unless that sum

1789.
Death of Fateh-
singh and disputes
regarding the succe-
sion.

had accrued since the treaty of Sálbye, or was part of the long standing account left open by Dámáji in 1753.

Mánáji, however, was not allowed to succeed to the post of guardian without opposition. Govindráv Gáikwár was living at Poona, and, though he had himself little influence with the Peshwá's immediate adherents, he had managed to secure the then powerful Sindia on his side.

This chief, since his recognition as plenipotentiary at the treaty of Sálbye, had been gradually making good his position with the Peshwa and his favourites as well as with the leading Marátha nobles, so as to be able to successfully oppose Nána Phadnis, when the time came for a coalition of the outlying chiefs against the ministerial party. Govindráv offered his son, A'न्द्रáv, as husband for the daughter of Sindia, a proposal which it is not probable that he ever intended to carry out. A grant of three lakhs of rupees was also promised, in return for which Sindia allowed his garrison in Broach to assist Govindráv's illegitimate son, Kánhoji, to reach Baroda.

Mánáji applied to the Bombay Government on the grounds that the steps taken by Govindráv were contrary to the provisions of the treaty of 1780. As, however, this treaty had been abrogated by the later agreement at Sálbye, the Bombay Government declined to interfere. Mánáji's agents at Poona contrived to get Nána Phadnis to propose a compromise, to which, however, Govindráv, at the instigation, probably of Sindia, declined to accede. Before any decision was reached, Mánáji died.

1793.

Govindráv becomes
regent at Baroda.

Nána detained Govindráv in Poona till he had agreed to hold by former stipulations and to cede to the Peshwa the Gáikwár share in the districts south of the Tápti together with his share of the Surat customs. To this the Government of Bombay demurred as an infraction of the provision of the Sálbye treaty whereby the integrity of the Gáikwár's possessions was assured. Nána Phadnis at once withdrew his proposals. Govindráv at last joined his brother at Baroda on 19th December, and took up the office of regent.

1796.

A'ba Shelukar,
Deputy Governor of
Gujarát,

For two years Gujarát remained quiet. In 1796 Bájiráv, son of Rághoba, succeeded to the Peshwá's dignity and at once appointed his younger brother, ten years of age, Governor of Gujarát. In accordance with Marátha custom, a deputy was sent to take charge of the province, one, A'ba Shelukar, and he too, seems to have administered vicariously, for next year (1797), we find him amongst those taken prisoners with Nána Phadnis when that minister was treacherously seized by Daulatráv Sindia in the Deccan. A'ba was released on promising to pay ten lakhs of rupees as ransom. He then joined his appointment as Subhedár in order to take measures to get together the money he required.

1797.

Disputes between
A'ba and Govindráv
Gáikwár.

Bájiráv Peshwa was anxious to embroil him with Govindráv, whom he knew to be favourable to Nána Phadnis and too powerful to be allowed to acquire influence beyond the reach of head quarter supervision. A cause of quarrel soon arose. Daulatráv pressed A'ba for part payment of the above ten lakhs, and the latter being unable to squeeze enough out of his own territory, forced contributions from some of the villages administered by the Gáikwár. Govindráv at once

took up arms against him and applied for aid to the English Agent at Surat. In this city Governor Jonathan Duncan had just assumed chief authority in accordance with an agreement between the English and the Nawáb. Duncan was anxious to secure for his government the land round Surat and the Gáikwár's share in the *chauth* of the town and district. Govindráv, when this demand was made, referred the Governor to Poona, knowing that under the treaty of Sálbye the British Government had no more right to acquire a share of the Gáikwár territory than the Poona authorities had when they made a somewhat similar demand in 1793, which was withdrawn, as stated above. Before the reference could be made, A'ba was penned up by Govindráv's own army in Ahmedabad, and forced to surrender that city. He was kept in confinement for more than seven years.

1798.

In the same year (1799), the Peshwa apparently without formally revoking the appointment of his brother Chimnájí as Subhedár, gave Govindráv a farm for five years of his whole rights in Gujarát, at the rate of five lakhs of rupees a year. These rights included shares in the Káthiáwár and Sorath tribute, the revenue of Petlád, Nápád, Ránpur; Dhandhuka and Gogha, together with rights to certain custom dues in Cambay and a share in the revenue of the city of Ahmedabad. Govindráv unfortunately died a month before this farm was formally made over by the Peshwa.

1799.
The Peshwa grants a farm of his rights in Gujarát to the Gáikwár.

As had happened at the death of Dámájí, so again now, the heir, A'nandráv, was all but an idiot and quite incapable of managing his affairs. The disputes as to the guardianship again set the whole state in confusion. Kánhoji, a son of Govindráv by a Rájputáni princess of Dharampor, who had been the first agent of his father in Baroda, in 1793, had been put in prison for refusing to give place to Govindráv when the latter at length joined him at Baroda. At the death of Govindráv, Kánhoji managed to obtain his liberty and to secure the ascendancy in the counsels of his weak-minded elder brother. He assumed, in fact, the whole government. His arrogant conduct in this new position excited the Arab guard against him and he was again thrown into confinement. His mother, Gajrábái, who was a refugee in Surat, endeavoured to get assistance from the English there, and at the same time made overtures to Malhár, son of Khanderáv Gáikwár, who had formerly been one of Govindráv's bitterest opponents.

Death of Govindráv, struggle for the succession.

Meanwhile the administration of the Gáikwár's affairs passed into the hands of Rávji and Bábáji Appa, two brothers, who had been brought to Baroda in 1793 by Govindráv himself. Rávji took charge of the civil work, whilst Bábáji undertook the military duties, which at that time consisted in great measure in collecting the revenue by show of force. These two ministers, on hearing of the proceedings of Gajrábái, outbid her for the aid of the Bombay Government. In addition to the cessions formerly offered by Govindráv, they were willing to give up Chikhli also.

1800.

Assistance sent by the British to Govindráv's party.

Matters were precipitated by the successes of Malháráv in the field. Rávji offered to subsidize five European battalions, and Governor Duncan took upon himself the responsibility of sending an auxiliary force of 1,600 men under Major Walker to act with the troops of Rávji and Bábáji north of Ahmedabad. Reinforcements were after-

1802.

wards sent up, but the campaign was not closed till April 1802, when the fort of Kadi had been taken by storm. Malháráv surrendered and a residence in Nadiád was assigned him with a liberal pension out of the revenues of that sub-division.

The fort of Sankheda, which had been held by Gunpatráv Gáikwár for his cousin Malháráv, was soon after this reduced and the country for a time pacified.

Agreement between
the British and the
Gáikwár's state.

In March, Rávji had an interview at Cambay with Governor Duncan, which was followed on June 6th by a definite treaty, of which the ground work had been previously sketched out in anticipation of the reduction of the revolted Gáikwárs.

Two thousand men, besides artillery, were to be subsidized and a *jáidád* or assignment for their payment, was made on the revenue of Dholka and the part of Nadiád not assigned to Malháráv. Chikhli was given to the British in reward for their aid in storming Kadi, and Residents were to be appointed reciprocally. A large sum of money was borrowed by Rávji, partly from Bombay, partly from Baroda bankers, to pay off the arrears due to about 7,000 Arab mercenaries, who had usurped a great deal of objectionable influence in civil affairs at the Gáikwár's capital. Major Walker was appointed Resident and proceeded to Baroda on 8th June.

Also with the
Minister, Rávji.

On the same day was signed a secret compact, assuring Rávji of the support of the British Government, and awarding him a village out of the territory ceded by the treaty of June 6th. It was deemed advisable by the British Government to have, at the Baroda court, some leading personage who might, in the present state of the relations between Bombay and Poona, further the designs of the former government in preventing a recurrence of the coalition of Marátha powers.

Rávji was sure of his reward if he served British interests, whilst in case of the reorganization of a Marátha confederacy the state he was administering would probably play but a very subordinate part in subsequent events.

Treaty of Bassein.

The treaty of June 6th was disapproved by the Court of Directors, as being in direct contravention of the treaty of Sálbye. Before, however, any orders had been issued by the Home authorities to restore to the Gáikwár the territory he had ceded, the Peshwa, out of regard for whom the treaty had been disavowed, was a fugitive before the army of Holkar, and by December had ratified these very concessions at the treaty of Bassein. By this treaty the Peshwa virtually placed his independence in the hands of the British. He ceded his share of Surat, thus giving them sole control over that district. In payment of the subsidiary force required he handed over territory in Gujarát, the revenue of which amounted to 12,28,000 rupees, and finally he constituted the British Government arbiter in the disputes between his government and that of Baroda. The grants made by the Gáikwár for the support of the subsidiary force amounted in 1802, to 7,80,000 rupees.

Events in Baroda.
The disbandment of
the Arabs.

Major Walker attempted to negotiate with the Arab guard, but the greater part of them flew to arms and released Kánhoji Gáikwár. The latter then tried to collect an army near Baroda, and succeeded

in obtaining possession of the person of A'nandrāv, the titular ruler. The British force then took the city by storm, after which most of the Arabs submitted, except a few who joined Kánhoji. The rest took the arrears due to them and left the country. Kánhoji was not subdued till February 1803. Malhárāv, meanwhile, had broken out in rebellion in Káthiáwár and was plundering the Marátha possessions there. Bábaji A'ppaji and a young officer, named Vithal Deváji (or Divánji) led the operations against him; and to the latter belongs the honour of having captured this troublesome member of the ruling family. The estate of Nadiád, which had been assigned to him by Govindrāv, was resumed by Rávji A'ppaji and made over in its entirety to the British Government. A treaty, supplementary to that of 1802, was drawn up, guaranteeing this cession as well as the *inám* or free gift of the fort and district of Kaira, "out of gratitude for the support given in the recent troubles to the Gáikwár's honour, and for assistance in securing the good of the State."

1803.

Malhárāv again breaks into revolt.

The Gáikwár's supplementary treaty with the British.

Very soon after this agreement, Rávji applied for an addition to the subsidiary force, in payment of which he assigned Mátar, Mahudha and the customs of Kim, Kathodra, a station about 17 miles north of Surat. His reason for strengthening the foreign element in the army appears to have been that owing to the reduction of the Arabs, the original native force was not enough to guard even the frontier, and that a great part of that duty fell on the European contingent, which was numerically insufficient for service on so extended a scale.

Further cessions by the Gáikwár to the British for a larger contingent.

This was the last public act of note on the part of this minister, who died in July, 1803, after adopting one Sitárám to succeed to his estate.

Death of Rávji A'ppa.

Whilst these arrangements were being carried out at Baroda, Bájiráv Peshwa, chafing at the dependence to which his straits of the previous winter had reduced him with regard to the English, was actively propagating dissension between Sindia and the Calcutta Government. Not long after, the war that had been some time imminent broke out, and a contingent of 7352 men from Gujarát was ordered to the field. In August or September, Broach and Pávágad¹ both fell to the British.

Hostilities between Sindia and the British Government.

At the treaty of Sirjè Anjangaon in December 1803, both Pávágad and Dohad were restored to Sindia, but Broach remained British. By this means one of the rising Marátha powers was extruded from the centre to the outlying portion of the province. The employment of all the British contingent against Sindiá's possessions in Gujarát precluded Major Walker from furnishing any portion of the army that was annually sent to collect the tribute in Káthiáwár. Rávji A'ppaji had expressly stipulated that some part of the contingent might be so used when it could be spared from its main duties. The Supreme Government agreed to the proposal when made by Governor Duncan, on the grounds of the advantage both to the Gáikwár and the tributaries of employing on this disagreeable duty a strong and well-disciplined force. Already some of the tributaries had made overtures to Major Walker with a view to obtaining British

The question of allowing the Gáikwár's British contingent to be used in collecting revenue by force.

¹ A celebrated hill-fort south of Chámpáner, in the Panch Maháls district.

1803.

protection against powerful neighbours. Governor Duncan was in favour of accepting the duty of protection and also of helping the Gáikwar's commander in his expeditions through the peninsula on these grounds.

Firstly.—The officer in command could exercise a certain supervision over the collections, in which the British, as part assignees, had a direct interest.

Secondly.—A way could thus be opened for the acquisition of a port on the coast from which the intrigues, supposed to be carried on by agents from the Isle of France, could be watched and counteracted. From such a point, too, the views of the Bombay Government as regards Cutch could be promoted.

Thirdly.—The commandant could take steps to improve the system of forcible collections, and towards abolishing the barbarous features of this rude method of levying tribute. He could also, perhaps, suggest some system by which the advantages of all three parties concerned would be better secured than by reliance on the uncertainty of temporary expeditions.

The fourth and last reason given savours strongly of the Marátha policy of the time, of which the leading maxim was *divide et impera*. It was represented that Bábáji who had successfully collected the tribute during 1802-1803, and whose subordinate and companion Vithal Deváji was a person of similar energy and capability, might possibly acquire too great influence if left in a quasi-independent command at such a distance from the Court. It was politic, then, to join with the force under his command a strong foreign body—thus dividing both the power and the responsibility. The war with Sindia caused these proposals to fall into abeyance for some time.

1804.

Renewal of farm.

The Resident at Poona was doing his best, meanwhile, to secure for the Gáikwár a further lease for ten years of the farm of the Peshwá's dominions in Gujarát, so that the inconveniences of dual government might be avoided. In October 1804 a ten years' farm was granted in the name of Bhagvantráv Gáikwár at an annual rate of 4½ lakhs of Rupees.

1805.

Definitive treaty
between the British
and the Gáikwár.

This grant led to the consolidation of all previous engagements into a single treaty, which was signed in April 1805. Previous agreements were confirmed and the whole brought into consonance with the treaty of Bassein. Districts, yielding 11,70,000 rupees per annum, were made over for the support of the subsidiary force, and arrangements were also made for the repayment of the cash loan advanced by the British Government in 1802, when the liquidation of the arrears due to the Arabs was a matter of urgent political necessity.

The British contingent was to be available in part for service in Káthiáwár, whenever the British Government thought such an employment of it advisable.

Finally, the same Government was constituted arbiter in all disputes of the Gáikwar, not alone with foreign powers, but also in the adjustment of his financial transactions with the Peshwa, his paramount power. These transactions, which ranged back from the capture of Dámáji in 1751, had never been the subject of a formal

investigation, and were by this time complicated by the numerous engagements with third parties into which both Governments had been obliged to enter at their various moments of distress. Bájiráv, who was apparently intriguing for a Marátha coalition against his new protectors, was careful not to bring before the notice of the chiefs, whose esteem he wished to gain, a provision which exhibited him as in any way dependent upon the arbitration of a foreign power. He, therefore, granted the farm for ten years to the Gáikwár, as much by way of remanding for a time the proposed inquiries and settlement of their respective claims as for the purpose of diverting the attention of the British to the administration of this new appanage, whilst leaving him free scope for his intrigues in the Deccan. He used, moreover, every pretext to defer the consideration of the Gáikwár question, until he could make use of his claims to further his own designs. His success in preventing a discussion of these transactions is apparent by the fact that in the financial statement of the Gáikwár's affairs made by Col. Walker in 1804, no mention of the Poona demand is to be found.

No important event took place during the next year or two. Bábáji relinquished the command of the force in Káthiáwár in favour of Vithalráv Deváji, whilst he himself took part in the civil administration at Baroda. The Resident, too, seems to have been likewise engaged in internal matters and in securing the country against an invasion by Kánhoji, now a fugitive at the Court of Holkar.

In 1807 the Resident made over A'ba Shelukar, late Sar Subhedár, of the Peshwa to the British Government, by whom he could be prevented from engaging in fresh conspiracies. After this, Col. Walker was at last enabled to leave Baroda in order to assist in the settlement of the Káthiáwár tribute question, an object he had long had in view, but which the necessity for his continuous presence at the Gáikwár's capital had hitherto prevented him from undertaking.

1807.

The changes with regard to the collection of the tribute from the chiefs of Káthiáwár, that were carried out in 1807, deserve a special description. Firstly, they placed the relations of the tributary to the paramount power on quite a new basis. Secondly, by them the British influence over both parties concerned was much increased, and the connection between the Governments of Bombay and Baroda drawn closer. Thirdly, they were, subsequently, as will be seen hereafter, the subject of much discussion and delay in the settlement of the questions at issue between the Peshwa and the Gáikwár, and lastly, their effect was most beneficial to both the chiefs and their subjects in removing the uncertainty that had hitherto pervaded the whole revenue administration of Káthiáwár.

The Káthiáwár Settlement.

Before entering on the details of the settlement itself, some description is necessary of the social and political state of the peninsula at the time the changes were introduced.

The greater part of the population of Káthiáwár consisted of two classes, chiefs and cultivators, called Bhomiás and ryots. The power of the former ranged from the headship of a single village up to absolute jurisdiction over several score. The ryots were usually tenants,

Social and Political state of Káthiáwár.

Social and Political State of Káthiáwar.

long resident in the province. The chiefs were in almost every case foreigners, invaders from the north and north-east. There were a few Muhammadan adventurers from the court of Ahmedabad, Káthis, animated by the love of plunder and cattle-lifting, Miánás and Vághelás, who had settled themselves on the coast on account of the facilities it afforded for their favourite pursuits of wrecking and piracy. More numerous than any others were the Rajputs, driven south by the disturbed state of their native kingdoms or by the restless spirit of military adventure to be found in a class where one profession alone is honourable. There is a certain uniformity in the building up of all these chieftainships. A powerful leader, with a sufficient band of followers, oppressed his weaker neighbours till they were glad to come to terms and place themselves under his protection, so as both to escape themselves and to take their chance of sharing in the plunder of others. It frequently happened in the growth of one of these states, that the *bháyád* or relations of the chief (who are sure to be numerous in a polygamous society) were influential enough to assume, in their turn, a partial independence and to claim recognition as a separate state. As a rule, however, they continued to unite with the head of the family against external foes, and only disagreed as to domestic administration. It is also noticeable that though so addicted to the profession of arms, the Rajputs cannot be called a military race; they possess, that is, few of the true military virtues; hence the slowness of their advance, and their failure in competition with perhaps less courageous, though more compact and pliable races. In Káthiáwar, fortified strongholds, formidable enough to an army moving rapidly without siege trains, arose in all directions, and even villages were surrounded by a high mud wall, as a protection against cattle-lifters.

The groundwork of these states being itself so unstable, their relations with each other were conducted on no principle but the law of the stronger. General distrust reigned throughout. Each chief well knew that his neighbours had won their position as he had won his own by the gradual absorption of the weaker, and that they were ready enough, whenever opportunity offered to subject his dominions to the same process. The administration of his territory consisted merely in levying, within certain limits sanctioned by long usage, as much revenue as would suffice to maintain himself and his forces in their position with regard to the surrounding states. When a foreign enemy appeared, there was no co-operation amongst the local chiefs in resistance. It was a point of honour not to yield except to a superior force. Each chief, therefore, resisted the demands made upon him until he considered that he had done enough to satisfy the family conscience and then, agreeing to the terms proposed, he allowed the wave of extortion to pass on and deluge the domains of his neighbour. It should be remembered that the peninsula had never been subjugated, though overrun times innumerable. The evil of invasion was thus transitory. To a chief, the mere payment of tribute tended in no wise to derogate from his independence. In his capacity of military freebooter, he acknowledged the principle as just. His country had been won by the sword and was retained by the sword, and not by acquiescence in the payment of tribute, so that if he could avoid this extortion he was justified in doing so. If he weakened his state in resisting

foreigners, he knew that his neighbours would certainly take advantage of the favourable juncture and annex his territory. It was his policy, therefore, after resistance up to a certain point, to succumb.

Owing to this national peculiarity, and to the general want of union in the province, both the Moghals and Maráthás found it advantageous to follow a system of successive expeditions rather than to incur the expense of permanently occupying the peninsula with an army which would necessarily have to be a large one. There is every reason to believe that in adopting the raid system the Musalmáns were only pursuing the practice of their predecessors, who used to take tribute from Jodhpur to Dwárka.

Some of the Subhedárs of Ahmedabad divided their tributary district into three circuits of collection, and personally undertook the charge of one each year. This was the *Mulakgiri* system. Besides this chief expedition, there was the smaller one of the Bábi of Junágad, and the still more minute operations of the Rával of Bhavnagar against some of his weaker neighbours. The great Ahmedabad expedition had long been an annual grievance and was conducted with some show of system and under special rules, called the *Raj-ul-Mulak*. Three of these rules are of importance, and seem to have been generally acquiesced in before the great incursions of Bábáji and Vithalráv at the beginning of the 19th century. The first was that the paramount power, (by which was meant the foreign government which was strong enough to enforce tribute from all the chiefs) had authority to interfere in cases of dismemberment—or in proceedings tending to the depreciation of the revenue or to the dismemberment, of any tributary state. It was again, an acknowledged rule that whilst the *Mulakgiri* expedition of the paramount power was in motion, no other army should be in the field throughout the whole province. The third provision was not so well established, but it appears to have been understood that the tribute from each state should be regulated by some standard of former date. In practice, however, the measure of the Marátha demand was simply the power to enforce payment.

The system of collection by *Mulakgiri*.

It is worthy of remark that about the beginning of this century, the resistance to the collection of tribute was stronger towards the west than in the east and south of the province. In the Mahi Kántha the lawlessness of the Koli chiefs, who had established themselves in the ravines and on the hills, necessitated the employment of a military force for collections. In the neighbourhood of Bijápur and Kadi, the chiefs would not pay tribute except under the compulsion of a siege or raid but the *Mulakgiri* system only reached its full development west of Dholka.

From these explanatory remarks the system and practice of the Maráthás can be clearly understood.

This race found their way to Sorath very early in their career in Gujarát. The first raid, probably, took place about 1711, when the Muhammadans were occupied near Ahmedabad. After this, incursions were frequent, and under Dámáji Gáikwár became, as has been seen above, an annual occurrence. This leader did more. With a laxity as regards caste, of which there is more than one example in his family, he took to wife a daughter of the chief of Láthi, whose dowry in land

Connection of the Maráthas with Sorath and Káthiáwár.

Connection of the
Maráthas with
Sorath, Káthiáwár.

gave him the standpoint he sought in the heart of the peninsula. He managed also to secure his position in what are known as the Amreli Maháls, probably under the force of circumstances similar to those which caused the weaker Rajputs to gravitate towards the stronger of their own tribe. His expedition through the peninsula, generally as near the time of harvest as possible was made regularly every year as soon as he had amassed a sufficient number of troops on the mainland to admit of a force's being detached for Mulakgiri.

The object of these inroads was plunder, not conquest; the leaders would readily have entered into negotiations for the payment of the tribute, had the chieftains been disposed to treat otherwise than after defeat. The expenses of such an army were heavy, and the more so, as the time during which it would be in the field was quite indefinite, and dependent entirely upon the amount of resistance offered. In more than one instance, the Marátha leaders were obliged to regularly beleaguer a town who usually had no artillery for a siege. Early in this century the town of Mália successfully defended itself against a remarkably well equipped force under Bábáji, and the Junágad state was usually avoided by the Maráthas as much as possible on account of the time it would take to reduce its army to terms.

It is not on record that the Mulakgiri force habitually devastated the country over which it passed, or caused much greater hardships to the ryots than are inseparable from the passage of an army in the field. There are, however, well authenticated stories of the depredations and damage committed during these expeditions. A village is said to have been deserted by order of the Bhomia in order that the timber of its houses might furnish fuel for the Marátha army on its march. Tortures were doubtless inflicted on men supposed to be well off, who were suspected to have hidden their property. A Marátha army was usually, if not always, ill disciplined, as is proved by the testimony of Mr. Forbes, an eye witness of the campaigns of 1775.¹ From the same writer it is learned what an immense proportion of camp followers there were to the actual combatants. If this were the case in a real campaign against a formidable and active enemy, it is likely that the irresponsible element was still larger in an expedition like this of Mulakgiri, where the enemy was insignificant, and the country at the mercy of the invaders. It is, probable therefore, that the troops have been credited with misconduct that should in point of fact be attributed to these Pindháris. In after years, when the expeditions were conducted systematically, villages on the line of march were always allowed the alternative of entertaining a pioneer or two, as a sort of guarantee. If no *bandhári* of this sort were accepted, the army occupied the place. In many cases the demands for supplies made by these pioneers were so exorbitant that the villagers preferred to compound in turn with them, also, for their absence.

Another method by which a chieftain might avoid the necessity of the army's passing through his territories, was by sending to the commander of the expedition an envoy, empowered to treat for the amount of tribute and to execute a provincial guarantee for its future

liquidation. This deed was destroyed on the subsequent confirmation by the chief himself of the agreement for the sum fixed.

This habit of taking securities in all engagements was so prevalent in all parts of the province, and played so prominent a part in the financial administration of the Gáikwár's home and tributary domains that its main features are worth describing. Securities and Guarantees.

It is a well known characteristic of Hindu dealings that no transaction is carried on by two parties alone, if a third can possibly be dragged in. This practice no doubt originated in the former insecure state of society when no man considered himself safe in person or property from Government on the one hand and his neighbour on the other. With classes like Kolis and predatory Rajputs, the feeling is intelligible enough, and from these it spread into other branches of the society.

To such a pitch was distrust carried in the early part of the nineteenth century, that the Gáikwár himself could find no one to enter into a contract with him without the guarantee of one of his own subjects.

The consequences of this practice, and the power it threw into the hands of the Arab mercenaries, who were the principal securities for the public debts, are matters that touch the history of the Baroda State, rather than that of the province.

The chiefs in their dealings employed a special sort of security which owed its validity not to political consideration like that of the Arab Jamádárs, but entirely to its religious and traditional character.

A society of the military type like the Rajput has a tendency towards caste and privilege. Without a leader the warlike instincts of the tribe would not carry them beyond petty robberies; whilst with a leader they can achieve greater exploits of valour and destruction. The successful chief, then, is idolized, and, after a certain stage, the privileges of the chieftainship become hereditary. Once this system established, the celebration of ancestors follows, and when circumstances are favourable to the perpetuation of the hereditary position, the genealogy of the chief is a matter of the highest importance, and the person entrusted with the record of this, is vested with peculiar sanctity. It is his duty to enter in it, not only the direct line, but the names of the more distant relations of the chief by whom he is retained, and also to be the continual chanter of the glorious deeds of their common ancestors. He is, therefore, a referee of the highest authority in questions of pedigree, or of the partition of inheritance. An injury to his person might entail the loss of the pedigree of the ruling family, (especially as many of the bards kept no written record,) and thus produce a misfortune which would be felt by the whole tribe. The chief, being a warrior, must take his chance in the field with the rest, but the person of the genealogist was sacred and inviolable. Amongst the Rajputs the greatest reverence was paid to purity of pedigree, and each principal family had its Bhát to record births and deaths amongst its members and to stimulate pride in their lineage by the recital of the wars and exploits of their ancestors. The Bháts and Chárans.

The Bháts and
Chárans.

These Bháts necessarily multiplied beyond the number of the families that could entertain them, so that many took to banking, and some to cultivation. Surrounded as they were by the social system of the Hindus, it was not long before they became differentiated into a distinct caste, and the inviolability of their persons formerly due only to respect for the pedigree was now extended to the whole tribe, even though a large proportion of it performed none of the duties of genealogists. Similar to the Bháts in many respects, notably in that of sacredness of person, were the Chárans, numerous in Káthiáwár, where they had founded villages and lived as ordinary cultivators. This tribe, also, claimed divine origin like the race whose annals they had the privilege of recording. It is said that Rája Todar Mal, the celebrated minister of the Delhi empire, was the first to introduce the practice of taking these Bháts as securities for the Rajputs. The assertion is possibly true, but rests merely on tradition, and after ages usually find some great man as a sponsor for all such innovations. It is clear, however, that for many years before 1807 no dealings of Kolis or Rajputs with the state or with each other took place without the security of a Bhát being taken. This practice seems to have been as prevalent on the mainland as in the peninsula, the Kolis having doubtless borrowed it from their Rajput neighbours after the Bháts had become a separate caste.

Under this system the Bháts acquired considerable wealth, as they usually demanded a percentage on the amount for which they became security. There are instances in which they presumed upon the strength of their engagements and sacred character to bully or dictate to their employer. Such was the case of the Rával of Bhávnagar in 1808, which is also interesting in another way, as showing how the spirit of industry and commerce tends to sap the old observances which have their roots in superstition. This chief engaged in trade, fostered merchants and increased his revenue. When his security, a Bhát, got troublesome and interfering, he applied to the power to whom he paid tribute to have the old security bond cancelled and a fresh one taken on his own personal responsibility. In doing this he seems to have been prompted by nothing but his appreciation of the modern code of commercial honour.

To return to the Mulakgiri: the tribute for which preliminary security had been taken seems to have fluctuated from year to year, but always with reference to a fixed standard. It was one of the Maráthas rules never to recede from a former demand, lest they should be thereby setting up a precedent for future years. They preferred to secure a year or two's arrears at the full rate to the payment of all the arrears due at a reduced rate.

In spite of this fiction of a settled *Jama* or tribute, the Maráthás, when they had a sufficient force at their backs, invariably demanded a larger sum, the excess being called *Khará-ját*, or extra distinct from the actual tribute. This ingenious plan of increasing the collections, originated, it is said, with Shivrám Gárdi and was carried out scrupulously by both Bábáji and Vithalráv in their tours. In fact, during the last few years of the old system, Vithalráv had so good a force with him that the extra demand formed a large proportion of the whole tribute collected and had been paid only

under strong protest. The British had not long been established in Ránpur, Gogha, and Dhandhuka before a few petty chiefs of Gohelvád and Sorath applied to the Resident at Baroda for protection against the Mulakgiri of the Nawáb of Junágad and the Rával of Bhávnagar, offering to cede the sovereignty of their states to the British on condition that certain rights and privileges were preserved to the chiefs and their families. The conditions they named were not such as were likely to meet with the approval of the British Government, and do not seem to have received much consideration. The proposals had, however, the effect of drawing the attention of the Bombay Government towards the state of Káthiáwár, and permission to aid the Mulakgiri of the Gáikwár by detaching a few companies of British troops was accorded by the Supreme Government. The outbreak of hostilities with Sindia led to the whole question as to the best means of collecting the tribute being for a time deferred. The internal disputes of some of the more turbulent estates, a few years afterwards, gave the Resident an opportunity of sending an envoy to one or two courts, to see how matters stood, and to open a way for a settlement in conjunction with the Gáikwár. Affairs at Baroda as has been mentioned above, detained the Resident there till 1807, in which year he joined Vithalráv's army with a British contingent at a place in the Morvi state.

The intervention of the British in the Mulakgiri.

Before treating directly with the chiefs a circular was sent round to all of them both by the Gáikwár's agent and by Colonel Walker, the Resident, containing the basis of the proposals with regard to the tribute about to be submitted to them. The position of the British Government throughout this negotiation is not clearly defined. Vithalráv in his circular mentions indeed, that a British force was with his own, but urges the chiefs to come to a settlement entirely with the government he represented. Colonel Walker's note was longer, more explicit, and conciliatory, but at the same time assumes a tone of protection and superiority. The replies of the chiefs were various, and, as a rule, seem to show that they regarded the British Government as the chief mover in these negotiations. They were probably aware of the position in which the engagements of the Gáikwár had placed him with reference to the British, and for some years had had the latter as their neighbours in the east of the peninsula. They were therefore not able at once to take in the whole scope of the action of the British Government in the tribute question.

Settlement of 1807.

Many seemed to take the note as a preliminary to a Mulakgiri on the part of the East India Company. The Rája of Mália, who had just been causing disturbances in the dominions of all his neighbours, had repulsed Bábáji and permitted the self-immolation of a Bhát rather than fulfil an engagement, openly proposed a joint expedition across the Ran to plunder Cutch and Sind. From the inquiries made by the Resident and from information gathered from the Gáikwár's accounts, it was anticipated that separate engagements need only be entered into with the twenty-nine chiefs to whom the circular invitation had been issued, provided that the rights and interests of subordinate members of the Bháyád were clearly defined in the agreement. When however, these rights came to be investigated in the light of the peculiar rules of Rajput inheritance, it was found that no

Number of tributaries.

less than one hundred and fifty-three persons had a claim to settle independently of each other for their tribute. This greatly prolonged the settlement, but at last the agreements were all framed on one principle. The amount settled was determined by a close scrutiny of the collections of past years, and Colonel Walker found it advisable to make great reductions in the item of extras or *Kharājāt*, for which the later Gáikwár collectors had had such predilection. The engagements were of the following nature.

Nature of the settlement.

(1) Financial agreement,

First, the chief bound himself, his heirs and successors, to pay at Baroda each year the tribute fixed in perpetuity in 1807. He also procured a counter security for this payment who engaged himself in this capacity for ten years. The Honourable Company's government had then to become security on the part of the Gáikwár for the fixity of the tribute demanded. This participation of the British in the engagement was insisted upon by the chiefs, and in all probability Colonel Walker was not averse from admitting it. Having thus arranged for the payment of the tribute, and guaranteed the amount to be demanded, it was proposed to take measures to prevent internal quarrels between the chiefs themselves. The object of a fixed settlement was simply to remove the necessity for overrunning the country from time to time with an irregular army and to protect the chiefs against extortion. It was found that, if the army of the paramount power were removed, all means of keeping order in the province would be lost, and the internecine feuds of the chiefs would soon destroy the good effects of the permanent settlement by materially altering the then existing position of the weaker feudatories, and rendering them unable to pay the tribute. It was also the wish of the British Government to bring about such a state of things in Káthiáwár that the presence of an army to control the chiefs would be wholly uncalled for, and that the chiefs themselves would co-operate to keep order and maintain the permanent settlement.

(2) Political agreement.

A second agreement, therefore, was called for from each signatory state, of the nature of a security for good and peaceful conduct. The counter security to this was usually that of another chief. This bond was perpetual. On the execution of both these engagements, the chief received a *Parrána*, or guarantee that the Gáikwár Government would not take from him more than the tribute agreed upon, and to this deed the countersignature of the Resident, on behalf of the British Government was affixed. This guarantee like the promise of the chief himself was apparently given in perpetuity. It will be noted that the amount of tribute was fixed permanently, but that it was considered advisable to renew the security every ten years. It is also remarkable that, except in the *Faizámin* or bond for good behaviour, the name of the Peshwá's Government, the rights of which over the tribute had only been temporarily alienated, does not appear. The total amount of the tribute thus settled was Rs. 9,79,882.

By means of these engagements the relations of the tributaries to their paramount power were made a matter of contract, instead of, as heretofore, a series of uncertain and arbitrary exactions dependent upon the respective means of coercion and resistance.

Seven years of the lease granted to the Gáikwár in 1804 by the Peshwa still remained unexpired and during at least six of these the arrangements that had been made about the Káthiáwár tribute do not seem to have been officially communicated to the latter's Government. It was not until 1815, when the Resident at Poona was trying to procure renewal of the lease for the Gáikwár, that an account of the settlement was drawn up in a draft agreement which the Resident submitted to Báji Ráv. In this draft, the curious mistake was made of mentioning the settlement instead of only the security bond as decennial. The Peshwa, whose policy was to protract negotiations, submitted in his turn a second draft which he said he was willing to sign. In this he seized at once on the supposition that the tribute was fixed only for ten years and stipulated for an increase at the expiration of that period. He also demanded that certain extra collections should be refunded by the Gáikwár, and assumed the British Government to have become security for the tribute owed by the chiefs to his own government.

Complications arising out of the settlement with regard to the Peshwa's title.

It was evident that no accord would be reached on the lines of either of these draft agreements as they stood. Before others were prepared, Gangádhur Shástri had been murdered and the treaty of June 1817 was a completed act, leaving further negotiations unnecessary.

Meanwhile the tribute, since the expiry of the farm of 1804, had been collected by a joint British and Gáikwár expedition, for it was found that partly from their own disputes and partly owing to the instigation of the agents of Báji Ráv, the chiefs were little disposed to act up to the engagements of 1807, either with respect to tribute or good conduct. The Peshwa, whose interference in the affairs of the peninsula had been constantly discouraged, declined to trouble himself to collect the tribute, the responsibility of which he asserted rested entirely upon the British and Gáikwár Governments. He subsequently ceded the tribute to the British Government on account of military expenses. After his fall in 1819 his territories, including the rights in Gujarát, fell to the British Government, and in 1820 the Gáikwár arranged that the whole of the Káthiáwár tribute, except that due from the districts directly subordinate to Baroda, should be collected by the agency of the British.

Subsequent arrangements regarding this tribute.

Turning to the events on the mainland, we find that soon after Colonel Walker's return from the above expedition, he introduced the Káthiáwár tribute system into the Mahi Kántha, in spite of the opposition of Sitáram Rávji and the anti-English party in the Darbár.

The Mahi Kántha settlement.

The territory ceded for the payment of the British contingent in 1805 was found to yield less revenue than had been anticipated, so in 1808 a treaty, supplementary to the consolidating one of 1805, was drawn up, allotting additional assignments amounting to about 1,76,168 Rupees to the British. This revenue was derived partly from alienated villages in Nadiád, Mahudha, Dholka, Mátar and near the Ranjar Ghát. The *Ghásdána* or tribute of Bhávnagar was also made over by this agreement. With regard to this latter acquisition, it is to be noticed that the agreement is drawn up in the name of the Honourable Company alone, and not in that of the British Government on ac-

1808.
Supplementary treaty between the British and the Gaikwár (financial).

count of A'nandrāv Gáikwár. It also differs from other engagements of a similar nature in containing a provision against the contingency of future irregular demands being made by the Peshwá's army. The reason for this distinction is evidently that the Bhávnagar contribution was not part of the Káthiáwár revenue farmed to the Gáikwár by Bájiráv, and was thus not divisible on the expiration of the lease. The right to this tribute rested with the British by virtue of the previous cession of Gogha, of which sub-division the fifty-nine villages of the Bhávnagar Bháyád formed part.

1809.
Okhámandal
settlement.

Next year the Okhámandal chiefs, who had not come under the settlement of 1807, were driven to engage, not to continue their piratical depredations along the coast, and to admit one Sundarji Shiyji as Resident on behalf of the British Government. The Gáikwár Government then, too, seems to have become their counter security, an arrangement which led to misunderstandings a short while afterwards.

1811.
Disturbances in
parts of Káthiáwár.

In 1811, some disturbances in Navánagar and Junágad and symptoms of discontent in Okhámandal took the Resident from Baroda into the Peninsula with part of the British contingent.

The Jám of Navánagar had got involved in pecuniary transactions with the Ráv of Cutch, and the British Government had mediated with a view of arranging for the repayment by gradual instalments. The Jám, however, repudiated all the engagements of 1807 both as regards the debt and the tribute, ejected the Gáikwár's agent from his dominions and prepared for war. He also began to incite the neighbouring chiefs to join in sweeping out the paramount power from the whole of Káthiáwár. It was not till after a considerable show of force that he laid down his arms and came to terms. Captain Carnac, the Resident, got him to submit the Cutch claims to the arbitration of the English Government, and after fixing them at Rs. 4,33,830, Captain Carnac made an arrangement, similar to that originally intended.

There remained now the question of a disputed succession in Junágad. Bahádur Khán, son of a slave girl, was put forward in opposition to a younger aspirant, Salábat Khán, reputed to be the son of a princess of Rádhapur. The Baroda Government with the concurrence of the Resident had admitted the claims of the latter. On a report, however, by the Assistant Resident in Káthiáwár, Captain Carnac was induced to alter his opinion and to support Bahádur Khán, on the grounds that Salábat Khán was a spurious child, and that Bahádur was ready to make concessions of value to the Gáikwár Government. The Bombay Council, however, disavowed all countenance of the claims of Bahádur Khán, and the matter was let drop.

1812.

In this year (1812) the Gáikwár had paid off the pecuniary loan borrowed in 1803 from the British Government, but there still remained the debts for which that government had become *Bhandári* or security, in place of the ejected *Jamíddárs* of the Arab force. These claims could not be paid off for at least two years longer, so that for that period the Resident was ordered to maintain the same close supervision of State affairs as heretofore.

1813-14.

Peshwá's claims on
the Gáikwár.

The next two years were spent chiefly in discussions with the Peshwa Government about the old claims by the Peshwa on the Gáikwár's

estate. There is no doubt that at the time of his death, Dámáji had not paid up nearly all that he had bound himself in 1753 to pay. On the other hand there had been at least six intermediate compacts between the Peshwa and various members of the Gáikwár family.

Amongst others was that of 1768, fixing the arrears of the previous three years. That of 1778, and of 1781, by the tenth clause of which Fatehsingh was excused payment of arrears for the time during which he was engaged in hostilities against Rághoba. Then came the agreement with Govindráv in 1797, to which a sort of debit and credit account is appended.

The Peshwa had been content, for reasons that have been above shown, to let these claims lie dormant during the currency of the ten years farm; but as the question of the renewal of this agreement became imminent, he gradually opened more frequent communications with the Baroda Council, using these claims as a pretext for sounding the disposition of the chief officials and ascertaining their feelings especially towards the British Government. When the negotiations for the settlement of these claims were fairly set on foot, he used every possible means to protract them till he had finally decided what he should do in 1814, when the Ahmedabad farm expired.

Negotiations carried on secretly by the Peshwa with a Baroda Court party.

It was easy for him to discover who were the malcontents at the Baroda Court. Sitárám, the adopted son of Rávji A'ppáji, having been found both incompetent and untrustworthy in the management of affairs, had been practically removed from any post of influence in the council, and was, moreover, chafing at the refusal of the British Government to recognize him in the same way as they had done his father. He had also been superseded as Suba of Káthiáwár by Vithalráv Deváji. Under these circumstances, and finding that he had the support of a large number of the older court party against the authority of the Resident and of his native agent, he either himself opened communications with Bájiráv, or readily listened to the counsels sent to him direct from Poona. Before long, agents were sent to the Peshwa Court by Takhtbái, wife of A'nandráv, with instructions, it is supposed, to thwart all the proposals and designs of Gangádhār Shástri, who had been recently sent as envoy by the Gáikwár Council of administration. The chief obstacle to the settlement of the Peshwa's claims, was the counter-demand made by the Baroda Government on account of Broach, which had been disposed of without the Gáikwár's consent, and also on account of the damage caused by the inroads of A'ba Shelukar, when accredited agent of Bájiráv in Gujarát.

There is no need to detail here the events that took place in Poona during these negotiations. On the expiration of the farm in 1814, Bájiráv appointed Trimbakji Dengle, Sarsuba of Ahmedabad. The latter, however, did not of course leave Poona, where his presence was indispensable to his master, but sent agents with instructions rather of a political than of a fiscal nature. He himself undertook the task of disposing of Gangádhār Shástri, whom he caused to be assassinated at Pandharpur in July 1815.

Meanwhile the Jam of Navánagar had died leaving a disputed succession. The Khavás chiefs of that state, instigated, probably, by

Further troubles in Navánagar and out-break in Kaira.

agents from Ahmedabad, began to usurp the government, and the whole question was submitted by the darbār to the Peshwa, as being Lord Paramount. The Ahmedabad Commander sent a body of two hundred cavalry to Navānagar, but before they could arrive, the Khavās revolt had been quelled by a British force detached from the contingent. They, therefore, dispersed through the province, inciting discontent and revolt amongst the Jats and Kāthīs. In Kaira they instigated a tribe of Kolis to attack the British lines by night. Sītārā Rāvji's adherents also collected a force at Dhar, a state well-known for lending itself for such purposes, and kept the frontier in confusion. Severe measures at Poona and Baroda soon put an end to this state of things, and at last Trimbakji Dangle was surrendered to the British Government to answer for his share in the murder of Gangādhār Shāstri. The discussion of the Gāikwār's debts, however, was carried on all through the year at Poona, whilst Bajirāv was maturing his then vacillating plans for extirpating the British from the west of India.

Cession of Okhā-
mandal to the Gāik-
wār.

The chiefs of Okhāmandal gave trouble in this year by again betaking themselves to piracy. Their territory was occupied by a British force. It will be remembered that in 1809 the Gāikwār's Government had become counter security for these chiefs, but owing to the distance of the district from a military post, the Baroda authorities found themselves unable to spare troops enough to put a check on the misconduct of their tributaries. At the time of occupation, the Bombay Government informed the Baroda Administration that they had no wish to permanently establish themselves at so distant a spot, which contained, moreover, a much-frequented shrine of Hindu worship, and that they were willing to put the Gāikwār in possession if he would engage to keep up a sufficient force in the district to protect the neighbouring ports and shores from the pirates and wreckers that infested the island of Dwārka and the adjoining mainland. The Bombay Government made a point of asserting on this occasion, in opposition, apparently, to some proposal by the Baroda darbār, that they could not admit that the mere fact of having become security or counter security gave any preferential right to the possession of the country. Finally, the Gāikwār Government agreed to the condition proposed, and the district was made over to them.

The British aid in
pacifying Junāgadh.

In the same year British aid was invoked by the Nawāb of Junāgadh who was oppressed by a too powerful minister, backed by the Arab mercenaries. After a settlement of this dispute had been satisfactorily brought about, the Nawāb, in gratitude, waived his rights to tribute over the territories recently ceded to the British in the peninsula, where his family had formerly great influence and considerable property. The escape of Trimbakji Dangle from Thāna, and the subsequent attempts of the Peshwa to prevent the recapture of his favourite, and to re-unite the Marāṭha confederacy, led to the execution of a fresh treaty on June 18th, 1817, in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Government.

1817.

Treaty between
the British and the
Peshwa.

It was intended to bind the Peshwa in such a way that he could never again enjoy the ascendancy amongst the Marāṭha chiefs to which he aspired. The Resident at Poona too took this opportunity of also putting an end to the discussions about the mutual claims on each other by the Poona and Baroda Governments.

The Peshwa agreed to abandon all claims on any territory in possession of the Gáikwár, and to accept an annual payment of four lakhs of rupees in satisfaction of all previous debts. The farm of Gujarát was made perpetual to the Gáikwár on the payment of four and a half lakhs annually, but the Káthiáwár tribute was made over to the British Government in liquidation of military expenses. The latter Government, by this treaty, also entered into possession of the Peshwá's revenue in Gujarát, except that of Olpád, which had been assigned to a favourite officer. All his rights, north of the Narbada, were also ceded.

These conditions necessitated a re-adjustment of the agreements with the Gáikwár, and on November 1817, a definitive treaty, afterwards, however, supplemented by one of November 1818, was executed between the Baroda and British Governments. The force furnished by the former state was found inefficient and the employment of a larger body of British troops was therefore necessitated. To pay for these, the Gáikwár ceded his share in the fort of Ahmedabad and the district immediately surrounding that city.¹ He also made over some districts near Surat, and the town of Umreth, in Kaira, with the whole of the rights acquired by the perpetual farm of Ahmedabad. The British remitted the *Moghlái* or dues taken by the Nawábs of Surat, on the Gáikwár's possessions near that city. Okhámandal, having now been pacified, was also given up to the Gáikwár, but revolted four months afterwards, and was not again subdued for a considerable time.

1817-18.

Definitive treaty between the British and Gáikwár.

At the final settlement of the dominions of the late Peshwa in 1819, the whole of his rights in Gujarát passed in sovereignty to the British, who remitted the four lakhs due from the Gáikwár in composition of arrears claimed by Bájiráv. The next year a special inquiry was made into the respective shares of the Peshwa and Baroda Governments to the Káthiáwár tribute and to the extra allowance levied by the Gáikwár, called *ghás-dána* allowance. In the course of this inquiry so many abuses of power and instances of extortion on the part of the Gáikwár's officers were brought to light, that the Bombay Government on these grounds and on account also of the general deterioration in the province since the Gáikwár's troops were stationed there, prevailed upon Sayájiráv, who had now succeeded to the throne, to let the duty of collection be undertaken and superintended by a British officer stationed in Káthiáwár, who should, however, employ the Gáikwár's troops on occasions of necessity.

1819.

1820.

The British obtain the right of collecting all the tribute from Káthiáwár and the Mahi Kántha.

A similar arrangement was made with regard to the Mahi Kántha, where the effects of the settlement of 1811 had been much weakened by the disorderly conduct of the Gáikwár's troops stationed there. The administration of nearly the whole of the province passed into the hands of the British, and the period of Marátha ascendancy came to an end.

It now remains to review generally the nature and characteristics of the Marátha connection with Gujarát, the chief events in which

Conclusion.

¹ Known as Daskrohi.

Conclusion.

have been chronicled above. The most prominent feature has already been indicated at the beginning of this section and is apparent throughout the whole narrative. It is, in fact, the small space in history occupied during this period by the people, compared with the share appropriated to the actions of the Government and its delegates.

The reasons for this are as easily seen as the fact itself. From first to last the Marátha interests in the country were, except at one or two special junctures, simply pecuniary ones.

In comparison with other countries within reach of Marátha arms, Gujarát has always had a very large proportion of inhabitants engaged in commerce and manufacturing industries.

It was the object of Shiváji to get as much booty as he could and carry it away, then and there; hence the commercial classes and manufacturers presented the most favourable opportunities for pillage, and the agriculturists were at first only mulcted in forage and provisions. Rapidity of action was another of Shiváji's aims, so not only were his visits short and their effects transitory, but all his booty consisted of property that could be carried away by his horsemen. No women or followers accompanied his expeditions, no prisoners were made excepting the few who could afford to pay a heavy ransom. Torture was only resorted to when the captive was suspected of having concealed his treasure. Cows, women and cultivators were, according to Shiváji's system, exempted from capture.

Assignments on revenue were seldom made by him, for fear of weakening his own authority. Subsequently, the Marátha demands became more regular and assumed the form of a certain proportion of the revenue. The *Sar-deshmukhi* and *Chauth* were supposed to be calculated on the standard assessment, so as to avoid subsequent claims as tribute or over-collection. In reality, however, they consisted of a fixed share in actual collections together with whatever extras the officer in charge could manage to extort, and which were, of course, kept undefined in any agreement.

The expeditions, too, moved more leisurely and in greater force. The passes and roads in their rear were protected by their own comrades, so that the booty could be brought to the Deccan in carts, and more bulky property therefore was removed than in former times. The time, too, when the demands were likely to be made, were known to the headmen of the district and village, so that the cultivators could be pressed beforehand to furnish their share of the contributions. The extortion by this means passed from the commercial classes down to the agriculturists—the latter having also the burden of supporting a larger and more cumbrous army for a longer period.

When the power of the Dábháde and his deputy, the Gáikwár, was fairly established, a regular system of administration was introduced. It will be remembered that, by the treaty of 1729 as few Marátha officers were to be employed as possible, beyond those necessary to collect the Dábháde's share of the revenue. In consequence, however, of the internal struggles of the Muhammadan chiefs, this minimum quota grew to be a large establishment, with the usual accompaniment

of alienations and assignments for the support of the officers and their religious institutions; which the weakness of the central power had allowed to become customary. The Dábháde himself was non-resident and his deputy usually being too valuable an assistant to be spared from the arena of Deccan politics, the collection was left to sub-deputies and their subordinates, who in turn delegated a great part of their duties to village officers and even to strangers. The Dábhádes, who were throughout more interested in the Deccan than in Gujarát, had, no doubt, an idea of raising up a power in the latter province in opposition to the administration of the Peshwa, which was conducted purely by Bráhmaṇ agency. It was soon evident, however, that all that could be done politically with Gujarát was to make it a treasury for the support of schemes that had to be carried out in the Deccan.

Conclusion.

The fertility of the soil, and the facilities the country afforded for commerce and manufactures both tended to make it unlikely to become a field for recruiting. The inhabitants of the towns had fixed and lucrative occupations; the cultivators were mostly of a class which on account of the fertility of their land, neither Muhammadan nor Marátha had been able to impoverish. The Maráthas had still to seek for soldiers in the rugged and barren country on the Gháts and in the Konkan, where the people could only look for a hand to mouth existence if they remained at home. The warlike tribes of Gujarát were, as has been already seen, too proud by birth and position to engage themselves to fight for any but their own race and interest. The aboriginal races were not likely to prove effective allies, even if they had been willing to move from their own woods and fortresses. None of the Marátha governors of Gujarát seem to have consistently attempted to weld the various interests subordinate to them into a cohesion and unity that they might have made politically useful against the Poona influence. All that they endeavoured to do was to draw from their charge as much revenue as possible, and to keep out interlopers. To the tax-payer the result was the same, whether his district was invaded by Kantáji or Piláji. If one anticipated the other in carrying off the harvest, the ryot still had to pay the latter for ejecting the intruder. The only resistance to be feared by the Maráthas was that, not of the cultivators, but of their own race or of the Rajput Girásiás. These latter were treated in all districts as mere robbers, probably, because, the class which bears that name near the Rájpipla where the Maráthas first came in contact with it, subsists usually on black-mail. In the north, however, the Girásiás were land owners of great influence and fixed residence, not likely to be conciliated by the knowledge that the invaders of their country classed them along with Bhils and Kolis as *Mehvásis* or outlaws.

In order to relieve the chief officials of direct responsibility for the revenue, the Gáikwár towards the last quarter of the eighteenth century—if not before, introduced the system of letting out each revenue sub-division in farm for from one to five years at a fixed annual rate. The farmer was as often as not an absentee, but the supervision and administration were never entrusted to any one but a Marátha Bráhmaṇ.

The revenue for the year was settled by an inspection of the accounts of previous years, and the crops of each village. The amount was.

Conclusion:

taken in kind, but the actual distribution of the whole on individual cultivators was left to the headman, who was in most cases made responsible for the assessment imposed on his village.

The frequent passages of hostile armies and other causes had left much culturable land a desert. In order to restore the population and induce colonists to settle and cultivate in such spots, leases on favourable terms were granted to *Desais*, who administered the land as they pleased, and were directly responsible to the head revenue authority of the sub-division for the annual rent. The *Patels* and other village officials also made use of their position with reference to the foreign supervisors in appropriating large tracts of waste land to their own uses.

The *kamāvisdār* or farmer for the time being, was interested only in recouping himself for the amount he had agreed to pay the Marāṭha Government, together with a margin for bribes paid to underlings at head-quarters for good offices with regard to the farm. He was ready, therefore, to make use of any agency in collecting his revenue that he found effective, and which saved the cost of a personal establishment. In many parts of the country there were hereditary village headmen, accustomed to the duty of extorting money from unwilling ryots. In other places, such, for instance as *Dholka*, it had been customary for certain Muhammadans called *Kasbātis*, to become responsible for the revenue of certain villages, in return for a discount on the *jama* or amount collected (*manoti*). These *manotidars* were found so useful by the Marāṭha officials that they gradually acquired an hereditary position and claimed proprietary rights in the villages for which they had been formerly mere agents for collection. They also acted as *Desais*, or colonists, and succeeded in getting their leases of certain tracts renewed long after they had ceased to actively improve the land, which had in fact, been all brought under regular cultivation.

Such was the agency employed in administering the revenue. The *kamāvisdār* was also the dispenser of justice, both civil and criminal. As his object was to make money and not to improve the condition of his charge, his punishments consisted chiefly in fines, and most offences could be paid for. No record of trials was kept except a memorandum of the amount passed at each decision to the credit of the farmer. In civil suits sometimes one-fourth of the amount in dispute was assigned as costs and appropriated by the Court. The *Girāsias*, in their own territory exercised somewhat similar jurisdiction, but grave crimes with violence were apparently left to the party injured or his relations to decide after the manner of the offence. Arbitration, too, was a frequent mode of deciding differences of both civil and criminal nature, but the *Kamāvisdār* or *Grāsia* usually managed that the State should not be a loser by such a method of settlement.

The whole system indicates clearly enough the slight hold the Marāṭhas had on the province and their desire to make the most of it for the furtherance of court intrigues or political ends above the *Ghāts*. There is nothing to show that they contemplated a permanent colonization of the country until the British Government undertook the task of dividing the Marāṭha nation by the establishment of a powerful and independent court at *Bareilly*.

The "home" of the Maráthás was always the Deccan, and for many years after they had effected a lodging in Gujarát, their army regularly returned for the rainy season to the country from whence they originally came. Their leaders were encouraged to be as much as possible near the court by the Dábháde, or the Regent on the one side, and by the Peshwa on the other:—the former on account of their weight with the army and the Marátha chiefs, the latter in order that their influence in a distant dependency might not grow beyond what prudence recommended, or might be counteracted if its tendency to increase became manifest. For similar reasons no force was allowed to be maintained in Gujarát sufficient to consolidate the Marátha acquisitions there into a manageable whole. Dámáji Gáikwár, had he lived, would undoubtedly have done much towards this end by means of his personal influence; but, as it happened, the thin crust of Marátha domination rapidly disappeared before it either was assimilated into the system of the province or hardened over it. A military occupation of a large and civilized district at a distance from the mother-country, and prevented by the jealousy of the central authority and the short-sightedness of those in charge of its exploitation, from either conforming itself to the elements it found already established, or absorbing the vital forces of the government it dispossessed,—a system without the breath of life, without elasticity, without the capacity of self-direction, imposed badly upon a foreign people, without even the care of preparing a foundation. Such seems to have been the Marátha government, containing within itself all that was necessary to ensure a precarious, but while it lasted, oppressive existence.